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LANDON LOWRY, TRUSTEE, ET ALS.
VS.
G. W. GILLS, ET ALS.
To THE Honorable Judges op the Supreme Court of Appeals
OF Virginia:
Your petitioners, Landon Lowry, Trustee, S. S. Lambeth,
Jr., Trustee, and J. H. Arrington, respectfully represent to
your Honors that they are, and each of them is, aggrieved,
for the reasons hereinafter fully set forth, by a decree of the
Circuit Court of Bedford County entered on the 29th day of
January, 1924; and your petitioners file this their petition
for an appeal and supersedeas from said decree.
A transcript of the record of said suit of C. W. Gills,
et al vs. Landon Lowry, Trustee, et al, is herewith exhibited,
from which it appears that the Supreme Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction of this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 17th, 1921, a written contract was entered into
signed by C. W. Gills, as purchaser, and John L. Abbot, sign
ing as agent for S. S. Lambeth, Jr., Trustee'*, and J. H. Ar-
ring^on, as sellers, covering the sale of ''all merchantable
goods in Arrington's Cannery."
The goods referred to were packed canned tomatoes.
A copy of this contract is set forth on page 32 of the ac
companying transcript.
S. S. Lambeth, Jr., Trustee, was, at the time this contract
was signed, ill in Asheville, North Carolina, and knew noth
ing of the transaction; nor has he ever ratified it. J. H. Ar-
rington declined to make delivery under said contract, having
been advised that he had no authority to make it.
On December 13th, 1921, C. W. Gills and others filed their
declaration iii detinue against Landon Lowry, Trustee (who
had been substituted trustee in the place of S. S. Lambeth,
Jr.) for the goods covered by said contract, alleging dam
ages sustained by reason of the non-delivery of the tomatoes,
in the amount of $15,000.00. For copy of the declaration, see
transcript, page 1.
Landon Lowry was, on the day of , 1921,
substituted as trustee in the place of S. S. Lambeth, Jr.,
Trustee. From the order of substitution (transcript page
32) it will appear that the ground of substitution was that
the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr. had "removed beyond the limits
of this State, and is incapacitated by reason of his bad health
to act as trustee".
It is admitted that S. S. Lambeth, Jr., had no notice of
the motion' for substitution, and that his absence from the
State was only by reason of his iU health, and that he had not
removed his residence from the State (transcript pages 61,
last paragraph, and 87, first paragraph).
It is clear that the statute gives no right to remove a
trustee, who is merely out of the State temporarily in search
of health, as is admittedly true in this case, and that in no ^^
event could he be removed without notice (and he had nonej
as is also admitted). Therefore, the whole proceedings are
void.
• The Court, deeming an action of detinue inappropriate,
and that the cause should be heard in equity, so ordered.
See transcript, page 17, for copy of order.
The plaintiffs accordingly filed-their bill in equity. See
transcript, page 18. The defendant, Landon Lowry, Trustee,
filed his demurrer and answer to said bill. Transcript page
33. And the defendant, J. 11. Arrington, did the like. See
transcript page 38.
Some months prior to the making of the contract for the
sale of said tomatoes, J. H. Arrington, his wife joining, had
executed a general deed of assignment, conveying these, to
matoes, along with all his other property, real and personal,
to S. S. Lambeth, Jr., Trustee, with broad discretionary pow
ers vested in said trustee for the administration and settle
ment of said trust. For copy of said deed of assignment see
transcript page 26. The Court, indicating in an opinion filed
(transcript page 44) that if, as was contended by the plain
tiffs, the assets of J. H. Arrington conveyed by said deed of
trust exceeded the liabilities, the sale of said tomatoes would,
be upheld, entered an interlocutory decree referring the cause
to a Commissioner to take an account of the assets and debts,
etc. For decree see transcript page 56.
On July 18th, 1923, S. S. Lambeth, Jr., Trustee, having
recovered his health, and having resumed the practice of law
at Bedford, filed his petition in this cause. For copy of peti
tion and ordjer filing same, see transcript page 57.
Upon a hearing the Court denied the prayers of the peti
tion "except so far as the same asks that said Lambeth be
treated still as trustee under said deed of trust, and said
Lambeth, trustee, is consequently made a party to this suit
and allowed to make such defense as to him may seem best'*
(transcript page 87).
The evidence taken in the cause may be found on page 2
et seq. of the transcript.
Your Honors' special attention is directed to the fact
. that the additional and important facts set forth in the peti-
tion of S. S. Lambeth, Jr., Trustee, (transcript page 57) are
cAl admitted by the defendants in error, as shown by the
Court's order, (page 87, first paragraph) "except the allega
tion as to the contractual capacity of J. Howard Arrington at
the time of the signing of the contract with C. W. Gills for
the sale of the tomatoes, as in the bill of complaint set forth,
which last mention allegation is not admitted'*; so that, to
the evidence is to be_ added the allegations of fact contained
in said Lambeth's petition, with the exception noted.
A reading of the references to the transcript in the order
stated will set forth the history of this case in proper se
quence.
Reference is also specially made to the deed of trust in
volved herein, from J. H. Arrington and wife to S. S. Lam
beth, Jr., Trustee, which is set forth on page 26 et seq.
ASSIGNMENT OF EBRORS
Your petitioners assign error to the action of the learned
Circuit Court of Bedford County, in entering the final decree
of January 29th, 1924. (Transcript page 87),.
First. The Circuit Court erred in over-ruling the de
murrers of Landon Lowry, Trustee, and J. H. Arrington to
the bill of complaint. See transcript page 33, for demurrer
of Landon Lowry, Trustee, page 38 for demurrer of J. H.
Arrington, and page 56 for decree over-ruling the demurrers.
To argue this assignment of error at length would only
be a duplication of what is contained in the record. The
grounds of the demurrers, which petitioners contend should
have been sustained by the Court, and the authorities in sup
port thereof, as well as the argument therefor may be found
in the transcript at the peges last cited (33 and 38), and your
Honors are respectfully referred thereto, and, in addition, to
the discussion of these demurrers in the petition of S. S. Lam
beth, Jr. (See page 62 of transcript).
But petitioners would emphasize two of the grounds of
demurrer discussed in the record, although not intending
thereby to waive the other grounds.
(a) It seems apparent, to petitioners, almost self-evii!^-
dent, that the Court erred in transferring this cause to a
Court of Chancery, for the reason that the claim asserted
was simply a demand for damages for non-delivery of goods
alleged to have been sold, a legal demand determinable in a
court of law and not chancery. There was no pretium affec-
tionis, nor allegation, of special value, and under the well set
tled principles of law, chancery had no jurisdiction—^petition
ers were entitled to a jury trial. It is true the goods spld
were held in trust, but the purchasers were not parties to the
trust. They were strangers to it, and their right of action,
if they had any right of action, was against the trustee in a
court of law. They recognized the legal nature of their de
mand by suing at law, and the court, of its own motion trans
ferred the cause to the chancery side, and in so doing erred.
See authorities cited in the argument found in the transcript
at the pages above referred to.
(b) The Second ground of demurrer which we would
specially emphasize is that the whole contract of sale was ul
tra vires and void. It was not made by the Trustee, nor
signed nor sanctioned by him. He was out of the State when
it was made and knew nothing of it. It was made by John
L. Abbott, who styled himself 'agent for S. S. Lambeth, Jr.,
Trustee' and by J. H. Arrington.
But John L. Abbot could not act as agent for the reason
that the Trustee, even had he been in Bedford, had no power
to confer authority upon Abbot, or upon any one to discharge
the discretionary powers vested in him as trustee by the deed
of trust. '^Ddeffatus non potest delegare". No principle
is better settled than this, and its application to this case can
not be escaped. To read the deed of trust is to see that it con
ferred very important and very responsible power upon S.
S. Lambeth, Jr., Trustee. He was chosen because of special
confidence reposed in him, as trustees are usually chosen, and
he alone could exercise those powers.
The learned Circuit Court meets this contention by hold
ing that, even though Abbot had no authority to sign the con
tract of sale as agent for Lambeth, Trustee, inasmuch as J.
H. Arrington also signed, his signature imparted legality to
the contract. But J. H. Arrington was the grantor in the
trust deed and by executing the deed he divested himself of
all title to, and control over, the trust subject, a part of which
were the tomatoes covered by this contract of sale. The low-
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er court answers this by arguing that the residue of th§ trust,
subject was ample for the payment of Arrington's debts, and
that therefore Arrington had a right to sell the tomatoes even
after he had conveyed them to the trustee. Notwithstand
ing this argument contained in the Court's opinion, the
learned Circuit Court by its interlocutory decree entered July
19th, 1922 (page 56 of transcript), refers the cause to a Com
missioner to ascertain whether " the remaining property of
the said J. H. Arrington will be sufficient to pay his debts."
But even though the remaining property were sufficient
to pay Arring*ton's debts, this fact gave Arrington no power
to sell any part of the trust subject. It had all been conveyed
to the trustee. The title was in him, not in Arrington. Ar
rington had no title to one can of the tomatoes, nor to one
acre of the land conveyed to the trustee. His claim was mere
ly to the surplm remaining after the payment of the debts.
To hold that a debtor may convey his property to a trustee
and then proceed to make contracts of sale respecting any
part of the property so conveyed, is to overturn all of the
accepted princ pies of law, to render trust deeds a nullity,
and to negative all the powers of a trustee created by solemn
deed.
Suppose Arrington, after the execution of the trust deed,
had conveyed off ten acres of the farm included in the deed,
would any one have accepted title to such ten acres! Would
any one, lawyer or layman, concede the right of a debtor,
after having assigned his land to a trustee, still to sell and
convey it, or any part of it ? If then, he could not convey the
land, by what law could he sell the tomatoes?
Petitioners have argued all this at length in their plead
ings, and they will not prolong the argument here, but earn
estly ask that your Honors will refer to the transcript pages
33, 38 and 62.
Second. For further error, petitioner S. S. Lambeth,
Jr., Trustee, shows that this whole proceeding is a nullity,
because he was never lawfully removed as trustee.
The learned Circuit Court by its final decree (page 87)
seems to recognize that said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., was not law
fully removed as trustee, and seems to recognize his status
as trustee still, notwithstanding his removal, but this recogni-
( .
tion seems to relate only to the future administration of the
trust and to the trustee's claim to commissions; for the
Court, while making the said'trustee a party to the suit,
nevertheless proceeds to enter a final decree, disbursing |the
fund and upholding the contract of sale, leaving to the Said
trustee no opportunity to defend the interests of the trust
committed to his hands, and leaving him no function save to
look on, and, possibly, to draw his commissions.
But petitioner, the said trustee, is not concerned about
his commissions. He is concerned to protect the trust and to
prevent the consummation of a sale which is in derogation
of the rights of innocent parties,, the wife and children of ^aid
Arrington, who while not active parties hereto, are vitally in
terested in the outcome.
Said petitioner contends that this whole suit is a case
of Hamlet with Hamlet left out; that he alone as truste^ is
the only person who ever had legal authority to make the sale
which is the subject of this litigation; that he did not make
the sale, that he did not ratify it, and that this whole proceed
ing is a nullity.
• For further argument, and for the admitted facts, he re
fers to his petition (transcript page 57).
Third. For further error, petitioners say that the *^al
decree aforesaid is contrary to law for the reason that, even
though the demurrers were properly overruled, upon the
pleadings, exhibits, and evidence, as set forth in the trans
cript, the same objections apply that have been set fort i in
the argument against the Court's action in overruling
demurrers.
That is to say, both as a matter of law and as a matter
of fact upon the record, the alleged contract of sale was in
valid, ultra vires, null and void ab imtio.
For the reasons hereinbefore set forth, your petitioners
are advised and represent to the Court that the decree ai ore-
said of the Circuit Court of Bedford County is erroneous, and
that your petitioners are, and each of them is, greatly ag
grieved thereby.
Your petitioners further represent that the said d(scree
is erroneous in other respects for reasons fully set forih in
8the demuTrers, answers, and petition hereinbefore referred
to, reference whereto is again specially made.
Your petitioners, therefore, and each of them, pray that
an appeal and supersedeas may be awarded them, and each
of them; that said decree may be reversed and annulled, and
that such decree may be entered by this Honorable Court as
should have been rendered by the Circuit Court of Bedford
County.
And your petitioners will ever pray.
LANDON LOWBY, Trustee,
J. H. ARRINGTON,
S. S. LAMBETH, Jr., Trustee;
LANDON LOWRY,
S. S. LAMBETH, Jr.,
Counsel for Petitioners.
Certificate of Counsel
I, S. S. Lambeth, Jr., an attorney practicing in the Su
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, hereby certify that in
my opinion it is proper that the decision of the Circuit Court
of Bedford County, as set forth in the foregoing petition and
transcript of the record, in the case of C. W. Gills et al vs.
Landon Lowry, Trustee, et al, should be reviewed by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
S. S. LAMBETH, Jr.
Received, July 25th, 1924.
P. W. C.
Appeal and Supersedeas allowed. Bond $300.00.
PRESTON W. CAMPBELL.
To the Clerk of the Court
at Wytheville.
RECORD
Virginia:
Pleas before the Honorable P. H. Dillard, Judge of the
Circuit Court of Bedford County, at the Court House, on
Tuesday the 29th day of January 1924 and in the 148th year
of the Commonwealth:
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: in the Circuit
Court of Bedford County on the 13th day of December 1921,
came C. W. Gills, G. M. "Wigginton, George W. Johnson and
J. T. Davidson and filed their declaration at law against Lan-
don Lowry, trustee, which declaration is in the words and
figures following, to-wit:
DECLARATION
C. W. Gills, G. M. Wigginton, George W. Johnson and J.
T. Davidson, complain of Landon Lowry, Trustee, of a plea
that he render unto said plaintiffs certain goods and chattels,
to-wit, 7,500.00 cases of canned tomatoes, which are now lo
cated in the cannery on the farm of J. H. Arrington, near
Kelsons Mill in Bedford County, Virginia, which canned to
matoes belong to the plaintiffs and are of great value, to-
wit, the sum of F ftecn Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) which
he unjustly detains from them, for this, to-wit: that hereto
fore, to-wit, on the 17th day of July 1921, C. W. Gills entered
into a contract with John L. Abbot, Agent for S. S. Lambeth,
Jr., Trustee, and J. H. Arrington, for the purchase of said
tomatoes, to be paid for as delivered, said tomatoes to be de
livered when they should be thereunto afterwards requested;
that afterwards, to-wit, on the day of August 1921, the
said Landon Lowry by an order of the Bedford Circuit Court
was substituted as trustee instead of the said S. S. Lambeth,
Jr., and as such trustee now has the care and custody of said
10-
goods and chattels; and although the said defendant after
wards, to-wit, on the day of August, 1921, was requested
by the said plaintiffs so to do, he hath not as yet delivered the
said goods or chattels, or any of them, or any part thereof,
unto the said plaintiffs who are entitled to recover the same,
and have the present right of possession, but hath hitherto
wholly neglected and refused, and still doth neglect and re
fuse so to do, and still wrongfully and unjustly detains the
same from the said plaintiffs, who are now claiming
[2] said goods, and are entitled to same, having purchased
same from C. W. Gills since the execution of the afore- .
said contract.
The plaintiffs allege that their damages amount to
Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00), and therefore they
institute this action of detinue.
Evidence taken in Court on December 13th, 1921.
JOHN L. ABBOT
Evidence of John L. Abbot for the plaintiffs.
D'.rect Examination
By Mr. Miller:
Q. Mr. Abbrt. are yon a lawyer I
A. Supposed to be.
Q. Were you practicing in Bedford in the latter part of"
1920 and the first part of 1921?
A. I was,
Q. As an attorney, were you associated with Mr. Lam
beth, who was also an attorney here at that time, in the pro
secution of his work?
A. Yes.
Q. Please state how you came to be associated with Mr*
Lambeth, and the c'rcumstances which gave you authority to
take charge of his office.
A. Mr. Lambeth got sick, either in December or Janu
ary, I do not remember exactly which it was, and he spoke
to me about helping him with his work, which I readily agreed
to do. He left his office from time to time, or rather, he was
not there regularly after this conversation I had with him,
but was at home. This was after November 9th, I believe.
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In December, I am not certain whether it was December or
January, he was at his home and I would go there frequently,
and he would tell me the different things he wanted done, and
we operated in this way for some time. The Mr. Lambeth
had to go away on account of his health, and he told me to go
in his office and take charge of it and do his work. In the
meantime, in regard to this Arrington trust, he had told
[3] me to attend to some other matters, for instance, I re
member the declaration of the ten per cent, dividend
with the consent of the bank and the can company, as well as
making preparation to have the tomatoes labeled. Now, that
is all of the authority Mr. Lambeth ever conferred upon me,
just the general authority to go in his office and take charge
of his work which I did. Mr. Lambeth left in January 1921,
and he has not returned since. I undertook to handle the
Arrington trust, and did what things I thought necessary and
made preparation to sell what I could sell. I got the claims
straightened out. The brokers, however, were not very will
ing to buy the tomatoes from me, because I would not guar
antee them as agent for Mr. Lambeth, Trustee, because the
trust could not guarantee the tomatoes. That put me in a
very difficult position in the disposal of the tomatoes on that
account. I was n correspondence with them and had conver
sations with them over the telephone frequently, but never
made any sale to them. Mr. Arrington had wanted to sell
these tomajtoes for some time, and I believe when they were
at 62^2 cents he came to me and wanted to sell one carload,
which he thought would be damaged in the event of high
water. His cannery is situated on a little stream on his place.
I, however, thought it not a sufficient price for them, and
further on account of the fact that I couldn't guarantee the
tomatoes, no sale was made of that car.
Mr. Arrington came and conferred with me constantly
about the handling of the trust funds, and we went along in
that way until some t'me in the spring, I don't remember
just when it was, he stated he thought he had better have a
sale of the personal property on the farm, and at that time
the deferred payments on the Kelso place had fallen due, and
there was no way of meeting them, and Mr. Miller and I de
cided it"was best to sell that place, which Mr. Miller did by
authority vested in him under a former deed of trust to him
self and Mr. Lambeth, trustees, either one or both to act. At
the same time we advertised the sale of this personal proper-
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ty and undertook to sell it, but it brought such oiit-
[4] rageously low prices that it was not sold. I believe a
cow or something like that was the only personal pro
perty sold at this sale.
The tomato market after that time picked up a little bit
and I was trying to dispose of these tomatoes in a lump at
the best price I could get for them. I tried to sell them to
Mr. Reaburn, Mr. Moomaw, A. S. White and Company of
Lynchburg and Clark Moseley, and I believe some others I
do not recall at present. I was not well informed about the
tomato market. I had never done anything of that kind be
fore and relied almost entirely on what I could find out from
others, and especially Mr. Gillespie, who had been a canner
of wide experience, and I was constantly having conversa
tions with him about the advisability of making a sale of these
tomatoes at certain prices. About the middle of July, I be
lieve it was Friday evening, Mr. Gills came to see me and
made an offer which was finally embraced in the contract of
sale^ which I now introduce in evidence, marked "Exhibit C".
The only other offer I had' that nearly approached that of
Mr. Gills was one from Mr. Clark Mosely, which amounted
to a few dollars more than Mr. Gill's offer, but was subject,
however, to the payment n a month's time. Under the con
tract with Mr. Gills, or rather under his offer, the tomatoes
could be delivered right away, and we could get the interest
on the money from the t me of delivery. Under Mr. Mose
ley's offer, payment was to be a thousand dollars cash, and
the balance at the end of thirty days. That evening I called
up Mr. Arrington, as I recall, on the phone, or rather sent
word to him. The next day he came to Mr. Lambeth's office
where I was, and I went over the inatter with h'm, and he
said he wanted to get 70 cents net for his No. 2's, but stated,
however, that he would 1 ke to talk to Mr. Gills about it. I
called up Mr. Gills, and Mr. Gills said he would see us in
Roadcap's in five mmutes, I believe. We went do^vn there
and met Mr. Gills. Mr. Arrington and Mr. Gills began mak
ing their arrangements, my position being, all the time,
[5] that I was not going to do anything contrary to Mr.
Arrington's wishes in the matter. They talked there
for some time, Mr. Gills saying he only wanted three hundred
cases, which he was willing to give 70 cents for, but he Would
buy the whole pack for 69 cents and finally it seemed that
he didn't want to take them. I went in the back of the store
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with Mr. Arrington and advised him to take Mr. Grills offer,
and he came out and he said he would take it, and then it was
I tote a piece of paper off the wrapping thing there and made
that memorandum, which Mr. Gills signed, and I signed as
agent for Mr. Lambeth, trustee, and Mr. Howard Arrington
signed.
Q. Ml*. Abbot, you stated that/ prior to this sale you
negotiated for the sale of these tomatoes with Mr. Eeaburn,
Mr. Moomaw, White and Company and Clark Moseley. Please
state what business these gentlemen are in and where they are
located.
A. Beaburn and Company, I believe it is, are brokers
in Eoanoke. Mr. Moomaw is B. F. Moomaw and Company,
Inc., engaged in the brokerage business and located at Clover-
dale, Virginia. Mr. Moseley is a trader around here.
Q. A. S. White and Company?
A. A. S. White and Company are engaged in wholesale
brokerage in Lynchburg.
Q. I hand you herewith a letter dated July 16, 1921,
from C. G. Reaburn, which reads as follows:
''Roanoke, July 16, 1921.
Mr. John Abbot,
Bedford, Virginia.
Dear Sir: I can sell a car of 2's tomatoes at eighty cents
per dozen, Bedford. Please advise whether or not you will
accept.
Yours very truly,
C. G. Reaburn
Please state whether or not you received this letter the same
day you closed the deal with Mr. Gills.
A. Yes, I received it on the morning of the day we
closed there. I might state I couldn't sell that car because
they were not willing to take it without guarantee.
,[6] Q. Please state, if you know, when he offered you
eighty cents per dozen, did that mean eighty cents net,
or what are the usual terms on which tomatoes are sold
through brokers?
A. One and one-half jjer cent is discounted for cash,
and the broker gets a three per cent commission, I believe. I
am not certain.
Q. Then if you had sold these tomatoes to Mr .Reabur^i
u:-
you would have gotten, net, about how much per dozen!
A. I would have gotten net about seventy-six cents with
the guarantee hanging over them, when I could not tell what
would result.
Q. Then, as I understand it,) you and Mr. Arrington
after considering the best offers you got from the most prom
inent brokers and tomato dealers in this section, decided that
under the circumstances under which you were selling these
tomatoes, the offer from Mr. Gills was the best offer at that
time you had.
A. Well, I considered it so myself. I don't know what
Mr. Arrington thought about it. I suppose he would rather
I would have sold them and guaranteed them, but I could not
do that.
Q. I hand you herewith another letter, dated February
21,1921, Bedford, Virginia, which reads as follows:
"To the creditors of J. Howard Arrington:
Dear Sirs: I have declared a dividend of ten per cent
on the amount owed by Mr. Arrington, and am enclosing
herewith my check in your favor for your part of the
dividend. This check is for the sum of $16.02. Mr. Ar
rington expects to be able to paj' his indebtedness in full,
and will declare further dividends as funds accumulate.
Please let me have a receipt for this amount.
Very truly yours,
' ' S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee
J. Howard Arrington."
Please state whether or not that is one of the letters which
you sent out in Mr. Lambeth's name to the creditors of Mr.
Arrington.
A. It is.
Q. Did you have, in Mr. Lambeth's office, a full list
[7] of Mr. Arrington's creditors, so far as known?
A. So far as I know, yes.
Q. Are you in a position to state whether or not all of
Mr. Arrington's creditors knew that you were handling this
affair for Mr. Lambeth?
A. No, I am not in a position to state that. The bank
and the can company knew it, and such growers as came to
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Mr. Lambeth's office to find out anything about the dividends
of the claims did. Further than that I cannot say.
Q. Can you give me a rough estimate of the total indebt
edness of Mr. Arrington?
A. As I recall, Mr. Arrington owed some twenty-one or
two thousand dollars, including the deferred payments on the
Kelso place.
Q. The Kelso place sold for ten thousand dollars, and a
little more than paid the debt against it, did it not?
A. I think so.
Q. Then after deducting that amount, his total indebt
edness was something like eleven or twelve thousand dollars,
was it not?
A. Possibly eleven or twelve or maybe fifteen. It was
in that neighborhood.
Q. Do you recall about how much he owed the Peoples
Bank and the Bedford Can Company, which I believe were
the largest creditors?
A. About five or six thousand dollars each.
Questions by the Court:
Q. Did you have any consultation with the creditors
secured in the deed of trust!
A. No, sir.
Q. Did they have any knowledge of this sale?
A. I believe the bank had no knowledge of it, but knew,
however, that I was trying to sell the tomatoes, and the way I
was going to sell them. As to the other creditors, except the
Bedford Can Company, which I suppose would know through
Mr. Gills, I had no consultation with them.
Questions by Mr. Miller :
Q. Mr. Abbot, from your knowledge of Mr, Arrington's
affairs at the time you gave them up, do you believe he
[8] was solvent and able to pay all of his debts?
A. It was my opinion that with this sale of the toma
toes Mr. Arrington would keep his farm that he lived on, with
an indebtedness on it of three or four thousand dollars.
Q. What, in your opinion, is that farm worth?
A. My opinion is based solely on what I have heard,
and it is to the effect that it is worth fifteen or twenty thou
sand dollars.
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Cross Examination
By Mr. Lowry:
• Q. Mr. Abbot, at the time the deed of trust was executed
by Mr. Arriiigton to Mr. Lambeth, trustee, oil the 9th day of
November 1920, you had a law oMce in a separate part of
the town from Mr. Lambeth?
A. Yes, sir, and had one there until I left Bedford in
August of this year.
Q. At that time you were not associated in any way With
Mr, Lambeth in the practicing of law?
A. No, sir.
Q. It is stated that Mr. Lambeth became ill in the month
of December you think, 1920, and it was at that time that you
had a general understanding with him that you would look
after his business in general?
A. It was, either in December or January, sometime be
fore he left. I do not undertake to state definitely, because I
don't recall.
Q. It is true that you have never qualified as substi-.
tuted trustee the room and stead of Mr. Lambeth, is it not?
A. It is.
Q. And the only authority under which you acted in un
dertaking to dispose of the tomatoes to Mr. Gills was the gen
eral authority conferred by Mr. Lambeth, as stated above?
A. It is.
Q. On account of Mr. Lambeth's illness he left Bedford
in the month of January 1921, and has not since returned?
A. That is true.
[9] Q. He has not in anyway confirmed any of your actions
with reference to that sale?
A. None whatever.
Q. You are not now in a position to state the total in
debtedness due by Mr. Arr'ngton correctly, are you?
A.. No, sir, I am not.
Q, You did confer with some of the growers who sup
plied Mr. Arrington with tomatoes, and those who labored
at his canning factory at different times, did you not?
A. Frequently one Would come in and want to know
something about it.
Q. And you undettook to make up a statement of these
various accounts due to these growers, did you not?
A. I did.
17.
Q. I have before, me a monwrandum showing the
amounts, and to whom due, and certain amounts due
to various growers who grew tomatoes for Mr. ArringtoiL
Will you please look at this memorandum and see if it is in
your handwriting?
A. It is.
Q. I have: added up the amount due by Mr. Arrington
to these growers, which, of course does not include his gen
eral indebtedness to the other creditors. According to my
addition the total amount due to these growers is the sum of
$5121.54. This memorandum I have mentioned did not in
clude the general creditors of Mr. Arrington, did itf
A. It did not.
Q. Have you any idea of the amounts of the various
debts due to^ these general creditoi*s,! other than the growers
mentioned, in this memorandum?
A. My recollection is that there were three other credi
tors of importance; one of the Peoples Bank; one the Can
Company, and one to Evelyn K. Arrington. There was other
indebtedness which amounted to but very little. The Bank's
debt, I believe, originally was five thousand dollars, and the
Can Company's debt something over five thousand dol-
[10] lars. Interest has accrued on both of them. The in
debtedness to Evelyn Arrington I believe, was nine
thousand, five hundred dollars, but I am not certain about
any of those things. It is just my recollection.
Q. Do you recall an indebtedness of about seventeen
hundred dollars to one Robert Arrington?
A. Yes, there was a note of Robert Arrington of some
amount, I never saw the note. There was some question or
contention about that. I d6 not know what it was.
Q. In the d'stribution of the ten per cent dividend re
ferred to by you, that d v'dend was only paid to the growers,
was it not?
A. To the growers and to the owners of those small ac
counts to the merchants here in town.
Q. After paying this ten per cent dividend to the credi
tors referred to, what assets or money was left in your hands,
what amount?
A. There was a fund in the bank of something over two
thousand dollars. The dividend amounted to about five or
six hundred dollars. It left somewhere around fifteen hun
dred dollars, I imagine.
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Re-Direct Examination
By Mr. Miller:Q. How many tomatoes did Mr. Arrington have at the
time this sale was made?
A. Somewhere between seven and eight thousand cases.
I do not know exactly. All were No. 2's except ahout two
hundred and seventy-four or five cases of 3*s, I believe.
Q. Then I will put the question this way. Do you recall
about how much you as trustee expected to receive for these
tomatoes upon this sale to Mr. Gills'?
A. I do not recall definitely, but it was something over
nine thousand dollars, I believe.
Q. Did you and Mr. Arrington make arrangements with
any one to haul these tomatoes to town, where they were to
be delivered?
A. Do you mean under this contract?
[11] A. Yes.
A. We had contemplated having the tomatoes hauled,
and I discussed the matter with Mr. Arrington. He said he
thought it would be better to have Mr. Ran Lee do it, and I
told him to get in touch with Mr. Ran Lee. He.got in touch
with Mr. Ran Lee, who came to see me, and we arranged with
"him to haul the tomatoes when we soM them My impression
is that this was done before anything was done with Mr. Gills
in the matter, meaning before we undertook to enter into a
contract with Mr. Gills. We were getting ready to sell them
and made arrangements with Mr. Ran Lee to ha;ul them.
Questions by the Court:
Q. After deducting what Gills agreed to pay for these
tomatoes, what would remain due under the deed of trust,
approximately ?
A. Some seven or e'ght thousand dollars.
Questions by Mr. Miller.
Q. Did you ever give Mr. Lee any instructions to haul
these tomatoes after you made the sale with Mr. Gills?
A. I told Mr! Arrington that evening to see Mr. Lee im
mediately and tell him to bring the tomatoes right in so that
we could get the money as quickly as possible.
Counsel for the defendant objects to all of the testimony
of this witness as inadmissible, irrelevant and immaterial on
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the issue joined between the plaintiffs and the defendant in
this action, and it is agreed by counsel for the plaintiff and
defendant that this objection shall apply to all questions and
answers of this witness.
The Court reserves the decision of this question as to the
admissibility of this testimony until he hears the argument
of counsel in relation to the whole case.
C. W. GILLS
Evidence of G. W. Gills for the plaintiffs.
Direct Examination
By Mr. Miller:
Q. Mr. Gills, what business are you engaged in?
A. In the manufacture of cans.
Q. Have you had any experience in handling canned
goods?
A. Not so much. Had some.
Q. You are the one who purchased these canned toma
toes from Mr. Abbott and Mt. Arrington, are you not?
[12] A. Yes, sh\
Q. For whom did you buy these goods?
A. "Well, I first thought of buying them, and afterwards,
before I bought them and before I bargained for them, I
asked some of the rest of them, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Davidson
and Mr. Wiggington, how they would like to go in with me
and buy them, and they said they wouldn't object if I thought
they could make any money out of it.
Q. Then you did purchase them under this contract
which has been filed here, did you ;iot.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It appears from the evidence that you bought these
No. 2*s at 69 cents net, while the market at that time was 80
cents. Will you explain why you bought them under what
appeared to be the market?
A. Well I bought them to be delivered in merchantable
condition, yet I took the risk of guaranteeing them to who
ever I made sale, and also I had to run the risk against leaks
and swells, which are guaranteed by the seller-in the general
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trade for six months after they are sold.
Q. Does this risk iisua;lly amount to much?
A. There was two-carloads sold through us this year,
and the leaks and swells amounted, if I recall carrectly, to-
something over five hundred dollars on the two cars.
Q:. Then in buying these tomatoes you knew you had to
resell them and take te risk af guaranteeing against leaks and:
swells?
A. Yes, and also that they were to be standard toma
toes, or else I would take a less price.
Q. Have you demanded delivery of these tomatoes since
you purchased them?
A. Well, they were to be delivered, if I recall right, in
sixty days, and I was told by Ran Lee that they had employed
him to haul the goods, and after he had gone over to Mr. Ar-
rington's to haul them, he said there had been a little advance
in the market, and he refused to let the tomatoes be de-
[13] livered. I mentioned to Mr. Abbot a time or two about
the delivery of the goods, but nothing was ever done
towards delivering them.
Q. Can you state what has been the.,h-ghest market in
tomatoes since you purchased these goods?
A. I think they have been sold at a dollar, and in some
few cases as high as a dollar fen, but the freight rates where
they were sold at a dollar ten was at an advantage over the
shipping points here.
Q. About what is the market on No. 2*s here?
A. Last offer I had, which was last week, was 87^
cents, though we are not getting any offers at all now. This
is the first offer I have had for quite awhile. 1 had named it
to the brokers to try to get an order for several others of our
customers who were anxious to sell before Christmas, and
that was the first offer we have had. for quite a wh!le.
Q. Then according to that, thd market is now about
cents higher than when you bought these, is it?
A. Well, I don't recollect exactly what they were at the
time I bought those. I think they were from 77^ cents to
80 cents but I am not certain about that, I think they were.
Counsel for the defendant objects to all of the foregoing
questions and answers of this witness, and not waiving his
objections thereto, now proceeds to cross examine the wit-'
ness.
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Gross. Examination
By Mr. Lowry:
Qj, Mr.. G-ills, how many cases of tomatoes, exclusive of
the Arrington tomatoes, has the Bedford Can Company
handled this year?
A^ We have not handled any for some time.
Q. Outside of those, how many cases have the Bedford
Can Company handled?
A. We have not handled, I don't recall any except Mr.
Overstreet's just now. The Overstreet tomatoes were
shipped through the Bedford Can Company. That is all I
think of just now.
Q. Didn't you buy the Johnson tomatoes too?
A. No^ sir.
Q. What tomatoes were they that you had the bad
[14] cases in?
A. They were Mr. Overstreet's.
Q. These tomatoes were haadled by the Bedford Can
Company, I believe?
A. They were shipped to the Bedford Can Company,
the Oversteet tomatoes.
Q. The Bedford Can Company is a corporation?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The chief stockholders are you, Mr. J. T. Davidson,
Mr. George W. Johnson and Mr. Gr. T. Wiggington?
A. There are four others, but we hold the greater part
of the stock.
Q. As a matter of fact, the other stockholders hold a
very small amount of stock, do they not?
A. Two of them hold xight smart. They hold more than
the other two, but they don't hold as much as we do.
Q. What I mean is this, you four men I have mentioned
practically own and control the business.
A. We hold a controlling interest.
Q. Who are the other stockholders?
A. J. J. Scott, Hunter Miller, Raphael, H. H. Dudley
and Dr. J. A. Rucker.
Q. What is the total capitalization of the Company?
A. It is capitalized at one hundred thousand dollars.
Q. What is the total holdings of these last mentioned
stockholders?
A. I don't-know just how many shares they hold. I
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think Dr, Ruoker's holdings must be fifty shares; Dudley
about the same, probably a little more. I don't know that
these, of course, are exactly right, because I—ask Mr. John
son, he is here. Mr. Miller and Mr. Scott own eleven,shares.
Mr. Eaphael, I expect, owns about the same maybe more.
Q. Then, at a total capitalization of one hundred thou
sand dollars outside parties own about eleven thousand dol
lars in stock?
A. Yes, sir.
Question by the Court:
Q. One hundred dollars a share?
A. Yes, sir.
Questions by Mr. Lowryr
Q. Mr. Arrington, in addition to being a farmer, was
[15] engaged in the canning business and was indebted to
the Bedford Can Company in about the sum of
$6,000.00.?
A. Between five and six, I think.
Q. Then you. understood to buy these tomatoes at the
price of 69 cents for No. 2's?
A. I did buy them.
Q. For the benefit of you four men, whose names have
been mentioned, expecting to make a profit on them?
A. Yes, sir, I expected to make a profit on them.
Q. The tomatoes were then being quoted at the time of
this contract as high as 80 cents per dozen?
A. It was 771/2 cents or 80 cents, somewhere along there,
I don't just recollect what it was.
Q. As you stated a few moments ago, they have been
as high as $1.10 per dozen since the contract in question was
signed?
A. They have been sold as high as $1.00 through this
section, and as high as $1.10 where the freight rates were
more favorable to the market. That is my recollection.
Q. The difference between the contract price at 69 cents
per dozen and what the tomatoes would have brought if they
had been sold at $1.10 per dozen, would have been something
like $6500.00, wouldn't it?
A. I didn't count. There was a discount which would
have had to come off of about 4^/^ per cent, in handling them.
Q. At the time this contract was undertaken to be made
between you and Mr. Abbott, Mr. Lambeth was not present.
23 :
was he?
A. No, sir.
Q. You have never negotiated with himj
A. Only with Mr. Abbot and Mr. Arrington.
Q. You have never at any time negotiated with Mr.
Lambeth, the trustee in the deed, concerning this sale, have
you?
A. No, sirt . -
[16] Re-Direct Examination
By Mr.. Miller f
Q. Mr. Gills, you said that since this sale had been made
you thought tomatoes had been sold at $1.00, and in some
places at $1.10. As a matter of fact, have you heard of any
being sold on the Bedford market at $1.10?
A. No, sir, not here.
Q. Then those that were sold at $1.10 were at some
other place where they had more favorable freight rates than
they have in Bedford?
A, Yes, sir.
R. C. LEE
Evidence of R. C. Lee for the plaintiffs.
Direct Examination
By Mr. Miller:
Q. Mr. Lee, where do you live?
A. On the north side about nine miles from Town.
Q. Were you employed by Mr. Arrington and Mr. Ab
bot to haul these tomatoes in to^vn about the time they were
sold to Mr. GiUs?
A. I was employed by Mr. Arrington.
Q. Did you receive instructions to bring thfem in?
A. He sent me word one afternoon to haul—^to come the
next morning to haul.
Q. Then who stopped you from hauling?
A. Mr. Arrington.
Questions by the Court:
Q. What did Mr. Arrington say?
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A. He told me—went up there to go to hauling, and
he told me there was a misunderstanding about the contract
and he wasn't going to have them haiiled at the present time.
Cross Examination
ByMr. Lowry:
Q. Do you remember when it was that Mr. Arringtan
talked to you about hauling the tomatoes ?
A. I think it was before he and Ml*. Gills had had any
contract. He agreed that when he should sell them he was to
let me know and I was to haul them.
Qu^tions by the Court:
Q. Did you understand when you went there to get
[17] them, where you were to carry them?
A. No, sir.
Q. What were you to do with them?
A. After I went he stopped me and didn't let me haul
at all.
Q. He told you there was some misunderstanding about
the contract, what contract?
A. Mr. Gills contract.
Questions by Mr. Lowry:
Q. Mr. Lee, I just understood you to say a moment ago,
and also understood Mr. Abbot to say that this agreement
that you had with Mr. Arrington about hauling the tomatoes
was before Mr. Gills had contracted to buy the tomatoes, was
that correct?
A. I think it was.
Q. Then you just had a general under^anding. with Mr.
Arrington that when he sold the tomatoes you were to haul
them?
A. Yes, sir.
Re-Direct Examination
By Mr. Miller:
Q. When Mr. Arrington sent you word to come and
,haul the tomatoes this was after he had made the contract
with Mr. Gills?
A. Yes, sir, when he sent for me to come, it was after
wards.
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And at anotlier day, to-wit:
At Bedford Circuit Court December 22nd, 1921.
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys, and
the Court, after having considered the record, being of the
opinion that the plaintiffs proceeded at law when they should
have proceeded in equity, a trust being involved, doth order
and direct tfiat this action be transferred to the equity side of
this Court, to which ruling of the Court both the plaintiffs and
the defendant excepted, which exceptions are overruled, and
leave is granted the plaintiffs ten days in which to file their
bill in chancery and the Clerk is ordered and directed to place
this action on the chancery docket of this Court. The Court
doth further order that the evidence and exhibits filed in this
common law proceeding be made a part of this record
[18] and transferred with the other part of the record to the
chancery side of this Court.
And at another day, to-wit:
At the rules held in the Clerk's Office of the. Circuit
Court for Bedford County, Virginia, on the third Monday in
January 1922, came C. W. Gills, G. M. Wiginton, Geo. W.
Johnson and J. T. Davidson and filed their bill in chancery
agamst Landon Lowry, trustee and J. H. Arrington, in the
following words;
Bill
Your complainants, C. W. Gills, G. M. Wiginton, Geo. W.
Johnson and J. T. Davidson, respectfully represent unto your
honor th<? following state of facts:
First; By deed dated June 5th, 1920, recorded in Bed
ford County Clerk's Office in Deed Book No. 130, page 126,
J. H. Arrington conveyed to Hunter Miller and S. S. Lam
beth, Jr., trustees, a tract of land in Bedford County con
taining 120.84 acres, in trust to secure three certain negoti
able notes for the sum of $2968.00 each, which represented
the unpaid purchase money due for said property, the said
deed of trust proving that either of said trustees might exe
cute the trust in case of default in the payment of said notes
when duel A copy of said deed of trust is herewith filed,
marked Exhibit A, and prayed to be read as a part of this
bUi.
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Second: By deed of trust dated Nov. 9,1920, recorded.in
said Clerk's Office in Deed Book No. 130, page 276, the said
J. H. Arrington and Mollie Arrington, his wife, conveyed to
the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, all of his property, both
real and personal, including the farm conveyed in the deed of
trust hereinbefore' mentioned, in trust to secure all of the
creditors, the said deed of trust being in the nature of a gen
eral assignment, giving to the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee,
full authority to sell any and all of said property, either pri
vately or publicly, to employ all such agents, laborers
,[19] and assistants as he might deem necessary for the
preservation, protection and general handling of the
trust subject. This deed of trust however, provided that the •
proceeds from the sale of the 120.84 acre farm should be ap--
plied first to the payment of the debts secured by the deed of
trust first above mentioned the balance of said fund, if any,
to be applied to the general creditors of the said H. Ar
rington. A copy of said deed of trust, is herewith^ filed,
marked Exhibit B, and prayed to be read as part of this .bilU
Third: That in pursuance of the terms of said deed of
trust last above mentioned, the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., who
was an attorney practicing at the bar at Bedford, Va., im
mediately entered into the discharge of his duties as trustee
under the said last mentioned deed of trust, and either per
sonally or through his agents ar representatives, took posses
sion of all of the property owned by the said J. H. Arrington,
which consisted ma'nly of the said tract of 120.84 acres and
also another f^m of 227 acres and 3 rods, situated about five
miles northwest of Bedford, being Imown as the home tract,
on which the said J. H. Arrington then resided, a lot of per
sonal property, consisting of horses, mules, cattle, hogs and
other live stock, a lot of farming machinery, crops, household
and kitchen furniture, etc., a lot of canned tomatoes supposed
to be about 7500 cases, each case containing two dozen of
tomatoes, probably about 7000 of them being what is known
as No. 2's, supposed to be packed in two pound cans, and
about 500 of what is known as No. 3's supposed to be packed
in 3 pound cans.
Fourth: Some time after the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr.,.
trustee, had so taken charge of said property and had be^n
the execution of said trust, his health became somewhat im-
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paired and on or about the day of ^—,.1921,
he associated with him Mr. John L. Abbot, another attorney
practicing at the bar in Bedford, Va,, and gave Mr. Abbot
full authority to take complete charge.of his office and to at-'
tend to all the business which needed attention and
[20] • especially to wind up the trust subject of the said J.
•H. Arrington, which at that time was taking a large
part of the time of the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee. Very
soon after the said John L. Abbot became associated with
the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, it became necessary for
Mr* Lambeth to leave Bedford temporarily on account of his
ill health, but before leaving he gave to the said John L. Ab
bot full authority to look after his office during his absence
and to wind up any unfiinished business and especially the af
fairs of the said J. H. Arrington under the terms of the said
deed of trust.
Fifth; Your complainants do not know the exact amount
of indebtedness against the said J. H. Arrin^on, but they are
informed and believe that the indebtedness is as follows:
Peoples National Bank ............ .$ 5480.40
Bedford Can Co., IncV 4890.95
H. Sowerby 279.00
J. A. Noell :: 42.36
J. R, Toms 686.20
J. R, Watson 8.19
J. L. Bays & Co. 36.00
Bedford Coal Co 18.30
Watson Bros 419.90
Bay Arrington 36.00
W. B. Hurt 10.30
L. R. Gills .; 64.50
. Burks-Ramsey Supply Co 65.50
Fancy Farm Roller Mills .;.... 9.80
. jCampbell Rucker .160.20
Parker-Ayres Co., Inc. 121.37
^ Berta Coles 42.10
Glemmie Toms 692.20
Mrs. J.. Carrie Toms 35.00
Total $13,098.27
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Sixth; 111 pursuance of the arrangement so made be- •
tween the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee and the said John
L. Abbot, the said John L. Abbot, with the full consent and .
approval of the said J. H. Arrin^pn, and likewise with the
consent and approval of the larger creditors of the said J.
H. Arrington, including the Peoples National Bank, the Bed
ford Can Co., Inc., and such other creditors as were informed
as to said arrangement, entered into the discharge of his :
duties, took entire charge of the said trust fund, ^ote let
ters to the creditors, obtained the consent and approval of
the Bedford Can Co. Inc., and the Peoples National Bank
to pay a 10 per cent dividend to the other creditors of the
said J. H. Arrington, including the tomato growers, which ^
dividend was actually paid by the said John L. Abbot
[21] out of some funds in bank to the credit of the said S.
S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee. And the said John L. Abbots
with the further consent and approval of the said J. H. Ar
rington and the larger creditors, proceeded to negotiate for
the sale of the said canned tomatoes. Your complamants rep
resent that canned tomatoes are usually sold through brokers
to the wholesale dealers, priced by the dozen cans, the usual
terms being IMj per cent discount and 3 per cent allowed the
brokers for mak.ng the sale, bift in order to make these terms
the seller has to guarantee the goods so sold against leaks
and swells for a per'od of six months from the date of sale.
The said John L. Abbot after negotiating with the various
dealers for the sale of the said tomatoes, on the 17th day of
July 1921, with the consent and approval of the said J. H. Ar-
rin^on, sold the said tomatoes to your complainant, the said
C. W. Gills, (who at that time was acting for himself, G. M.
Wiginton, Geo. W. Johnson and J. T. Davidson), under a
contract, a copy of which is herewith filed, marked Exhibit
C, and prayed to be read as part of this bill.
Seventh: It Avill be noticed from the contract that your
complainants were to pay for said ' tomatoes 69 cents per
dozen for No: 2's and $1.05 per dozen for No. 3's, but they
were sold without any ^arantee, and your complainants were
making the purchase outright and were to pay for all mer
chantable goods which were delivered under the terms of the
contract. Your complainants further allege that at the time
this sale was made the market price on 2's was about 77%
cents to 80 cents per dozen, according to the usual terms, and
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your complainants therefore allege that the prices noieiitiolied
in this contract were fair and equitable as of the date on
which the contract was executed, taking into consideration the
fact that they were sold without any guarantee against leaks
and swells, and yottr complainants in order to re-sell these
tomatoes on the market, which they expected to do, would
have t0 make Such guarantee and be responsible foi'
[22] any leaks arid swells which Inight occur within six
months from the date of such sale, and would also have
to pay the usual brokerage and discount as hereinbefore set
forth.
Within a few days after said contract was signed, your
complainaats notified th€f said John Li Abbot and J.- H* Ar^
rington that they wefe ready to receive the said tomatoes and
requested that they be delivered at the storage house of the
Bedford Can Co. in Bedford, Va., as pTovided for in said con
tract. Your complainant's are informed and believe that after
the said contract was entered into the said J. H. Arrington
engaged one R.- C. Lee to haul the said tomatoes and that the
said Lee actually went to the place of the said Arrington for
the purpose of delivering same^ but in the meantime' tomato^
had advamjed slightly in price and the said J. H. Arrington
refused to-deliver the said go(!>ds and still refused to do so.
Eighth; That by an order of Bedford Circuit Court, en
tered on the day of 1921, Landon Lowry,
another attamey praeti«ing^ ai the Bedford Bar, was substi^
tuted in the place of tW s'aid S..S. Lambeth, Jr.j trustee, witfe
full powers to execute the said trust in accordance with the
terms of the said deed of trust ;> a co^y of the order appoiat-
ing* the said Landon Lowry, trustee, is herewith filed, malrfced
as Exhibit D and prayed to be read as part of this bill.
Ninth: That default was made.in the payment of the
debt to Evelyn Arrington, which is secured by deed of trust
hereinbefore mentioned, to Hunter Miller and S. S. Lambeth,
Jr., truste^es,. and- the said Hunter Miller being, requested so*
to dx5 by the beneficiary therein named and acting, under the
terms: ot the said deed of trust, advertised and sold th^e- said'
fa®Ta m the 9th day of- July 1921, for $10,000.00, the proceeds^
frojfltsaM salsa'being: suffircient to pay the debt secured' by that
d€eii^ <5^^ the expenses of the saib^. and- the bailan<5er f
saisS sate has?since been- paid to the- said^Land^on Lowry,. trui?-
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tee, for the said J. H. Arrington.
Tenth: Your complainants represent that they have
since demanded the delivery of the goods from the said J.
H. Arrington and Landon Lowry, trustee, and are able, ready
and willing to pay for same as delivered, in accordance
[23] with the terms of said contract, but the said Landon
Lowry, trustee and J. H. Arrington both have refused
to deliver the same to your complainants.
Eleventh: Your coiUplainaiits are advised, believe and
charge that the property of the said J. H. Arrington now in
the hands of Landon Lowry, trustee, will be more than
enough to pay all debts of the said J. H. Arrington. Your
complainants believe that after all his debts have been paid
he wiU own property worth between $10,000.00 and $20,000.00,
and your complainants are therefore advised tiat. inasmuch
as the said J. H. Arrington is solvent and owns enough pro
perty other than said tomatoes, to pay all of his creditors, he,
together with the said John L. Abbot as agent for S. S. Lam
beth, Jr., trustee, had a right to make the sale of said toma
toes to your complainants. Your compla.nants are further
informed and believe that the creditors of J. H. Arrington
are making no objection to the said contract being executed,
and would have no r ght lo make such objection if they de
sired to do so, for the reason as above ind cated, that their
debts will be paid in full and leave a considerable balance to
be paid over to the said J. H. Arrington.
Twelfth: Your complainants therefore, being without
remedy save by the aid of a court of equity, pray that Landon
Lowry, trustee, J. H. Arrington, The Peoples National Bank,
the Bedford Can Co. Inc., H. Sowerby, J. A. Noel^ J. R. Wat
son, J. L. Bays & Co., Bedford Coal Co., Watson Bros., Ray
Arrington, W. B. Hurt, L. R. G 11s, Burks-Ramsey Supply
Co., Fancy Farm Roller MOls, Campbell Rucker, Parker-
Ayres Co. Inc., Berta Coles, Griemmie Toms and Mrs. J. Car
rie Toms, all residents of Bedford County, Va., be made par
ties defendant to this bill and. required to answer the same,
but not under oath, as answer under oath is hereby express
ly waived; that the said Landon Lowry, acting as substituted
trustee for S. S. Lambeth, Jr., be directed to proceed to exe
cute the said trust by delivering to your complainants the
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said canned tomatoes which they so purchased, or if the said
defendants should contend that there was any doubt
[24] about the property of the said J. H. Arring^on being
sufficient to pay his debts, and the Court is of the
opinion that there is any merit to said contention, then your
complainants would ask that an account be ordered and di
rected, showing the amount of funds in the hands of said
trustee, the amount of property in the hands of the sai^ J. H.
Arrington which has not been disposed of, including real and
personal property, and the amount of debts against the said
J. H. Arrington which have not been paid, so that the Court
may have before it information as to the solvency of the said
J. H. Arrington.
Your complainants allege that the said J. H. Arrington is
solvent and therefore is the only one interested in the sale of
the said tomatoes; your complainants would ask that all such
other accounts and inquiries may be directed as may be neces
sary and proper, and all such other and further, general and
special relief may be granted to your complainants as the
nature of the case may require and to equity shall seem meet.
'And your complainants will ever pray, etc.
Exhibit A With Bill
This deed, made this 5th day of June in the year one
thousand nine hundred and twenty (1920) between J. H. Ar
rington of the County of Bedford, in the State of Virginia,
party of the first part, .Hunter Miller and S. S. Lambeth, Jr.,
trustees as hereinafter set forth, parties of the second part,
and the holder of the notes hereinafter described and secured,
party of the third part.
"Witnesseth: That the said J. H. Arrington doth grant
and convey unto the said trustees, either or both of whom
may act hereunder.
All of that certain tract or parcel of land, situate near
Kelsons Mill and Peaksville, in Bedford County, Virginia, adjoining the lands of, L..,D. Johnson, S. C. Arrington and
others, containing 120.84 acres, and being the same property
which was conveyed to the said J. H. Arrington by deed bear
ing-date the 5th day of June 1920, from Evelyn K. Arrington
and W. J. Arrington, her husband, to which deed refer-
[25] ence is specially made for further description. This
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deed of trust being given to secure the deferred pay
ments, and being part and parcel Of the same transaction with
the conveyance by the deed aforesaid.
But this conveyance is in teust to^ secure to the holder,
or holders thereof three certain, negotiable promissory notes
of even date herewith made by the said J. H. Arrington, pay
able to the order of the said Evelyn K. Arrington, in the sum
of $2968.00 each, said notes being payable respectively one,
two and three years after date at the Citizens National Bank
of Bedford, Virginia, bearing interest at the rate of six per
centum per annum, from date, the interest being payable
annually, on the 5th day of June in each year. And it is ex
pressly covenanted that this deed of trust is given to secure
any note or nctes, bond or bonds given in renewal of the above
described notes or any of them, in whole or in part, either
proximately or remotely. And upon this further trust, that
the said party of the first part may remain in quiet and peace
able possession of the above described land, taking the rents
and profits thereof to his own use until default shall be made
in the payment of the above described notes or renewal notes
or in the performance of any covenant in this deed contained.
And upon such default, the said trustees, so soon as they may
be requested so to do by the holder of said notes or renewal
notes, shall offer the above described property for sale at
public auction^ to the highest bidder, at such t.me and place
and upon, such terms and in such parcels as to the said trus
tee may seem proper (it being the intention hereof to invest
sai^ trustees with full power and discretion as to the making
of said sale, and as to the execution of this trusty including
the right to have all necessary surveys andl subdivisioas.
made) provided, however, that before making said sale, the
said trustee shall give notice of the time, terms and place
thereof by not less than three successive weekly insertions
in one of the newspapers published in Bedford Gounty, Vir
ginia. And out of' the proceeds'- of such saie,, after firall pay
ing- the costs and expenses thereof, including*a eonmiissf(?aiL tO'
said trusteCj of five per centum upon the selling price
[26i|: of said land, the said trustee shall pay the debt afor
said, or so mueh thereof as may remain unpaid,- and?
the^ balance ii any, he shall pay to liie said J. H. Arrington,.
his administrator or assigns. And the sard J. HI Andngton
covenants that he willi pay ths' taxes upoiii said landipajomptty
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as the same shall accrue, during the pendency of this loan;
that he will insure the buildings upon said land for the bene
fit of the beneficiary hereunder in a sum not less than $ ,
and that he will keep the said buildings so insured. And if
the said j. H. Arrington shall fail to pay said taxes, or shall
fail to pay the prem ums on said insurance, the beneficiary
or the trustee hereunder, may pay the same, or any impaid
taxes, and any sum or sums, so paid, shall be deemed an addi
tional sum secured by the lien of this deed of trust.
And the said party of the first part hereby waives the
benefit of his homestead exemption as to this deed of trust,
and as to the debt and obligation secured hereby, and he fur
ther covenants that upon payment of the debt hereby secured,
he will pay the cost of a valid release of record of the lien
of this deed of trust.
And the said J. H. Arrington covenants that he is seized
in.fee simple of the above described property; that he has a
right to convey the same; that he has done no act to encum
ber the said land, and that the same is unencumbered; that
the purchaser hereunder shall have quiet and peaceable
possession of said land, and that he, the said party of the
first part, will execute such further assurance of title as may
be requisite. In testimony whereof witness the signature and
seal of the said J. H. Arrington hereunto affixed, the day and
year first above written.
J. H. ARRINGTON (Seal).
Exliibit B With Bill
This deed made this the 9th day of November, in the year
one thousand nine hundred and twenty (1920), between j.
Howard Arrington and Mollie A. Arrington, his wife, of the
County of Bedford in the State of Virginia, parties of
[27] the first part, and S. S. Lambeth, Jr., Trustee, for the
trusts hereinafter declared, party of the second part.
Witnessbth: That the said parties of the first part do
grant and convey unto the said trustee, with general warranty
of title, subject, however, to the exemptions hereinafter re
served, all of the property both real and personal ©f every
d^escription and wheresoever situate; belonging to the said
J. Howard Arrington, including any and all debts due him,
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said property consisting in the main of the following:
(1) A certain tract of land situate in the County of Bed
ford, Virginia, near Kelso's Mill and Peaksville, adjoining
the lands of L. D. Johnson, S. C. Arrmgton and others, con
taining 102.84 acres, and being the same land which was con
veyed to the said J. Howard Arrington and husband, dated
June 5th, 1920, and duly of record in the Clerk's Office of
Bedford County, Virginia; the conveyance of this land, how
ever, being subject to the indebtedness secured thereon by
deed of trust dated June 5th, 1920, from the said J. H. Ar
rington to Hunter Miller and S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustees,
which trust deed is also of record in said Clerk's Office.
(2) All of the packed tomatoes of the said J. Howard
Arrington, the same being stored on the farm formerly own
ed by the said J. Howard Arrington, lying on the waters of
Big Otter, near Kelso's Mill, and being the same land on
which he now resides, but it is intended to convey and the
first parties do hereby convey, any and all packed tomatoes
belonging to the said J. Howard Arrington, wheresoever same
may be.
(3) All of the horses, mules, cattle, hogs and all other
live stock of whatsoever nature, all of the farming imple
ments, machinery and tools and all O'hier machinery of every
sort; all of the crops, hay, com and other food; and in short,
all of the goods and chattels of the said J. Howard Arring
ton, with the exception of the household and kitchen furni
ture and poultry; all of the said personal and chattel property
thought to be at the place of his present residence, but it be
ing the intention hereof to include any and all of the same
wheresoever situate.
(4) All of the right, title and interest, or equity, of the
said part'es of the first part in and to that certain tract
[281 of land on wh'ch said parties now reside, containing
227 acres and 3 roods, being situate about five miles northwest
of Bedford City, being formerly a part of the Mount Pro
spect Farm, and being the same land which was conveyed, by
the said parties to Robert Arrington by deed dated October
26th, 1920, of record in said Clerk's Office in De6d Book No.
130, page 242; and being the same land which was conveyed
by said Robert Arrington to S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, by
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deed of even date herewith, to which reference is made. The
conveyance of the first parties of their right, title and equity
in said last mentioned tract is subject to the trusts, conditions
and reservations in the said deed from Robert Arrington to
S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee.
But this conveyance is upon the express trusts that the
said trustee shall take custody and possession of the said pro
perty, both real and personal, in person, or by agent or agents,
and administer the same according to his judgment,and dis
cretion, for the benefit and payment of the creditors of the
said J. Howard Arrington in the following order of priority,
to-wit:
First: The trustee shall first pay all the costs and ex
penses incident to the administration of this trust, including
a commission to said trustee of five per centum on the aggre
gate amount on all sales made hereunder, and a fee for serv
ices in drawing this deed.
Second: There shall next be paid to the said Mollie A.
Arrington, wife of J. Howard Arrington, the sum of $2500.00
which shall be in lieu of her contingent dower estate in all
of the lands hereby conveyed, and which sum shall be deemed
a prior lien upon the trust subject hereby created; in con
sideration of Avhich pr'or lien, the said Mollie A. Arrington
has joined in the execution of this deed of assignment.
Third: The said trustee shall pay all of the remaining
indebtedness against the said J. Howard Arrington, with the
exception of the indebtedness due Evelyn K. Arring-
[29] ton, as deferred purchase money upon the aforesaid
tract of land lately bought from her, which deferred
purchase money is secured as a first lien upon the said tract
of land as herein set forth.
With the exception of the last named indebtedness, all
of the remaining indebtedness against the said J. Howard
Arrington, after payment of the said Mollie A. Arrington of
the sum above provided for, shall be paid ratably and without.
preference or priority of any sort as between different credi
tors, all of which shall be paid in full, if the assets shall be
sufficient..
Fourth: If the land on which said Evelyn K. Arring-
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ton's debt is secured shall not suffice to pay the same, as the
same becomes due and payable, then the said trustee shall
out of any sui-plus remaining in his hands, after payment of
the debts hereinbefore provided for, pay any unpaid sum due
the said Evelyn K. Arrington.
And it is further provided that if the proceeds from the
sale of any lands in which the said Mollie A. Arrington shall
be entitled to contingent dower shall not amount to a sum
sufficient to ent.tle the said Mollie A. Arrington to the sum
of $2500.00, as the commuted values of her contingent dower
right, then said sum set aside for her as a preferred claim
shall be reduced to an amount which will represent the sum
to which she may be legally entitled.
But this deed is made upon the further distinct reserva
tion that the said J. Howard Arrington, and should he de
part this life, those legally entitled, may set apart and re
serve out of the said trust property such goods and chattels
in kind as he, or they, may be entitled to under the exemption
laws of this State, known as the homestead and poor law ex-,
emptions. The articles selected under the homestead exemp
tion to be valued and appraised by disinterested parties.
And the said parties of the first part do further empower
said trustee to exercise the fullest-discretion and authority in
the administration of this trust. He is hereby g.ven authority
to adjust, settle or compromise any and all debts, or demands
due to or by the said J. Howard Arrington. The said trustee
may make sale of any and all of the property, real or
personal, hereby conveyed, upon such terms and at
[30] such time and place upon such notice as he may deem
proper and conducive to the best interest of the trust]
and he may, if he shall deem it best so to do, make such sale
or sales, of the real or personal property, or any part there
of, privately, and not at public auction; And he is also au
thorized to execute all proper deeds of conveyance, or other
necessary wi'ifngs.
And the said trustee shall not be responsible pecuniarily
for the exercise in good faith of such judgment and discre
tion, but he shall be responsible for any fraud or breach of
trust.
The said trustee is authorized to employ all such agents,
laborers and assistants as he may deem necessary for the
preservation, protection and general handling of the trust
subject. Said trustee shall not be required to make sale of
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said property forthwith, either as to the real or personal pro
perty, but if, in his judgment, by reason of the existiug finan
cial situation, he shall deem it best to hold the said property,
' or any part thereof, for future sale, he is given authority so
to do, provided, however that none of the said property, real
or personal, shall be held for a period longer than twelve
months from the date hereof.
And if the said property, real or personal, shall be so
held, the said trustee shall have authority to handle, admin
ister and protect the same; and, in particular, he may make
all such arrangements and contracts as may be necessary for
the cultivation of said lands during such period.
It is, however, the expressed hope of the parties of the
first part that it may be possible to dispose of said property
in the near future, and the authority so conferred upon the
said trustee in this regard is merely to enable him, if he deems
it advantageous, to hold the trust subject in order to realize
therefrom a larger sum for the benefit of the creditors.
This deed is upon the further trust that after the pay
ment of all the debts properly chargeable against the said
J. Howard Arrington, all of the surplus remaining in the
hands of said trustee shall be bj"^ him turned over to the said
J. Howard Arrington, his adm'n'strators or assigns.
And the said trustee is authorized to advance any sum
of money and if necessary to borrow the same, that
[31] may be required for the initial costs of the administra
tion, or for the protection of the said property, and
any such sum shall be deemed a prior debt and obligation to
be repaid before any debt secured hereby is paid.
It is further provided that the said trustee shall require
all of the creditors to prove their debts before him within a
period of sixty days from this date; but, in his discretion,
the trustee may receive proof of such debts after the expira
tion of said period.
And this conveyance is upon the further condition that
if there shall exist as of this date any legal lien against any
of said trust property in favor of any creditor, such lien shall
be preserved and satisfied by said trustee out of the funds to
come into his hands, and the order of payment herein pro
vided for shall, to the extent necessary to satisfy such lien,
be, and the same is, hereby amended.
And this conv»eyance is subject to the further" condition
that if the property hereby conveyed, other than the farm of
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120.84 acres, purchased from Evelyn K. Arrington and hus
band, shall suffice to pay all the debts against the said J.
Howard Arrington, other than the debt due said Evelyn K.
Arrington for unpaid purchase money on the land purchased
from her, then the said trustee may convey back to the said
J. Howard Arrington, or to whom he may in writing direct,
the said land purchased from the said Evelyn K. Arrington,
and the unpaid purchase money due for said land shall re
main a prior lien thereon as at present. And the said debt
for such unpaid purchase money shall not in such event par
ticipate in the fund administered by said trustee.
In testimony whereof witness the following signatures
and seals of the said J. Howard Arrington and Mollie A. Ar
rington, hereunto affixed, the day and year first above writ
ten.^
J. HOWARD ARRINGTON, (Seal)
MOLLIE A. ARRINGTON (Seal)
[321 Exhibit C. With Bill
Bedford 7-17-21
J. Howard Arrington's Tomatoes
To C. W. Gills-
Goods sold—All merchantable goods in Arrmgton's can
nery—
Price on No. 2's, 69 cents net
Price on No. 3's, 105 cents net.
Goods to be labeled &delivered to Bedford Can Company
Factory in Bedford in good merchantable condition—^by J. H.
Arrington.
To be inspected on delivery &accepted according to con
dition—^unmerchantable goods to be refused.
Payment on deliverj*^ of each thousand cases.
Re.iected goods to be stored '*n factory by 0. W. Gills for
a period of six months.
Title to pass on delivery & acceptance.
Full delivery in sixty days.
C.W.GILLS,
JOHN L. ABBOT, Agent for
S. S. Lambeth, Jr., Trustee;
J. H. ARRINGTON.
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Exhibit D With Bill
It appearing to the Court by satisfactory evidence that
S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, named in a certain deed of trust
made by one John Howard Arrington and MoUie A. Arring-
ton his wife, bearing date on the 9th day of November 1920,
and duly admitted to record in the Clerk's Office of Bedford
County, Virginia, in Deed Book Noi 130 at page 276, has re
moved beyond the limits of this State, and is incapacitated
by reason of his bad health to act as trustee. And it further
appearing to the Court that all parties interested in the exe
cution of the trusts declared in said deed of trust have had
reasonable notice of this motion to substitute a trustee in the
room and stead of the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., and that none
of the said parties are infants or insane persons. It is there
fore considered by the Court that Landon Lowry be,
[33] and he hereby is, appointed and substituted as trustee
in the room, place and stead of the said S. S. Lambeth,
Jr., trustee in the said deed of trust executed as aforesaid
by the said John Howard Arr.'ngton and Mollie A. Arrington,
his wife, on said 9th day of November 1920, of record as
aforesaid in said Clerk's Office in said Deed Book No. 130
at page 276, and the said substituted trustee is hereby vested
with all the powers, duties, responsibilities and discretion
heretofore vested in the sa'd S. S. Lambeth, Jr., under and
by virtue of the terms of the said deed of trust. And the
said Landon Lowry, substituted trustee is hereby directed to
proceed to execute the trusts in accordance with the terms
as declared in the sa'd deed of trust.
And at another day, to-wit:
At Bedford Circuit Court on the 31st day of May 1922.
On the motion of the defendant, Landon LoAvry, trustee,
in open Court, leave is granted h'm to file his demurrer and
answer to the bill of the said complainants, whereupon he
filed the same; and on the motion of J. H. Arrington, in open
Court by counsel, leave is granted him to file his demurrer
and answer to the bill of the complainants, whereupon he filed
the same; and on the motion of the defendants, H. Sowerby,
J. A. Noell, J. R. Toms, J. R. "Watson, Watson Brothers, Ray
Arrington, W. B. Hurt, Burks-Ramsey Supply Company,
Fancy Farm Roller Mills, Campbell-Rucker, Parker-Ayres
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Company, Incorporated, Berta Coles, Clenrmie Toms and
Mrs. J. Carrie Toms, in open Court, by counsel, leave is
granted them to file their joint answer to the bill of the said
complainants, whereupon they filed the same; which said
demurrers are set down for argument.
Demurrer and Answer of Landon Lowry, Trustee
The said. Landon Lowry, trustee, demurs to the bill of
the said complainants, and says that the same is not suffici
ent in law.
And for grounds of his said demurrer sets forth the fol
lowing :
(1) The bill shows on its face that it is a suit for the
specific performance of a contract for the sale of per-
[34] sonal properly having no pretivm affectioms, and
states no case of irreparable injury for the alleged
breach of the contract, but on the other hand shows on its
face that the purchase was made by the complainants for the
purpose of resale at a profit. The subject matter of the con
tract was canned tomatoes possessing no unique characteris
tics, and that such articles are ordinary articles of barter and
sale, readily procurable in the market. The remedy of the
complainants is full, ad-equate and complete at law "for dam
ages, if any they are entitleid to, for the alleged breach of the
contract set up. The bill furthermore shows that the alleged
makers of the contract are solvent.
To sustain this proposition reference is here made to the
following authorities:
Langford v. Taylor, 99 Va., 577
25 R. C. L., page 293
36 Cyc., page 554
Pomeroy on Contracts "Specific Performance" 2iid Ed.,
Section 11 says:
"The doctrine is equally well settled'that, in general,
a Court of equitable jurisdiction will not decree the spe
cific performance of contracts relating to chattels, be
cause there is no specific quality in the individual article,
• which gives them a special value to the contracting party,
and their money value recovered as damages will enable
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h\rr\ to purchase other in the market of like kind and
quality."
(2) The bill shows that the alleged sale of the tomatoes
was not made or confirmed by the trustee, and this was a non-
delegable duty, requiring the exercise of his personal judg
ment and discretion, and that therefore the contract alleged
is void as to the trustee and his successor in trust.
(3) The complainants are not creditors secured by the
trust deed, and have never established any claim against the
trust estate. Furthermore the bill makes no averment of an
illegal, fraudulent or dishonest administration of the trust.
The trust is discretionary, and a Court of equity has no juris
diction to interfere with its exercise, so long as the trustee
acts in good faith, either in exercising or refusing to exercise
the power vested in h'm. (Gidens v. Clem, 107, Va.,
[35] 435). And especially is the Court without jurisdiction,
at the instance of the complainants, to administer the
trust estate, because the complainants are not creditors there
by, secured, and their rights, if any, are by way of a suit at
law to establish their damages, if any, for the alleged breach
of contract for the canned tomatoes.
(4) No party to. the deed of trust, or creditors thereby
secure^ is seek ng the administration of the trust through a
Court of Equity, and no other person has a right to do so;
but, even if this were not so, the complainants must first
establish, in a Court of law, the damages they are entitled to
recover, if any, against the trustee for the alleged breach of
contract for the sale of personal properties, having no pecu
liar or unique characteristics.
(5) The contract alleged shows neither mutuality of
remedy, nor mutuality of obligation. The contract alleged is
with only one of the complainants, so) that this defendant
could not have had specific performance of the contract, in
any event, against any of the complainants, excepting C. W.
Gills. Had the goods been tendered and C .W. Gills refused
to receive them, this defendants remedy (had the contract
been valid) would have been by action at law for the contract
price, or the losses sustained, if any, in reselling at the risk
of C. W. Gills, and this defendant would have had no remedy
in equity.
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(6) The complainants do not allege in their bill that
the purchase price for the tomatoes alleged to have been pur
chased has been paid; nor is there a tender with the bill of
the purchase price therefor. For answer nnto the said bill
of the said complainants, or to so much thereof as your re
spondent is advised it is necessary or material he should
make answer, answers and says:
1, 2 and 3: He admits the averments in paragraph first,
second and third of the bill of the complainants, and it is true,
as alleged in said bill, that the trustee S. S. Lambeth, Jr., took
possession of the property conveyed to him by the said
[35] J. H. Arrington, and the said trusts were administered
by the said trustee in accordance with the terms of
said deed of trust.
(4) It is true, as alleged in paragraph .four of the said
bill that some time after said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., had taken
charge of said property and begun the execution of said
trusts, his health became impa red to such an extent that he
had to leave the State of Virginia, and he has been out of said
State for more than a year, and s'nce leaving Bedford, in
the month of January 1921, the said trustee has not admin
istered or attempted to administer the said trusts imposed
on him by the said deed of trust.
It is furthermore true at the time said Lambeth left h s
law practice in January 1921, John L. Abbot who was- a
practicing attorney at this bar, and not prior to that time as
sociated with the said Lambeth, took charge of Mr. Lambeth's
Office for the purpose of attending to the business generally
of the said Lambeth.
Your respondent, however, avers and charges that the
said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., did not resign as such trustee, and.
he continued as such until your respondent was appo'nted and
qualified in the C'rcu't Court of Bedford County, Virginia,
on the 17th day of August 1921, as substituted trustee in the
room and place of the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., with all of the
rights, powers and duties which were formerly vested in the
said Lambeth by virtue of the deed of trust aforesaid.
Your respondent further avers that the said John L. Ab
bot never qualified as trustee under the said deed of trust,
and was never vested with any authority to act thereunder.
Further answering your respondent says that no sale
of the tomatoes in question was ever inade l)y said S. S. Lam-
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beth, Jr., Trustee, to the said complainants or to any of them,
nor was any such sale made by your respondent; that the
said alleged sale was made long after the said Lambeth, Jr.,
had left the State of Virginia; that he kneiv nothing of such
attempted sale; that he has never known of it, or ratified or
approved it or the contract purporting to carry it intp effect;
that your respondent likewise has never ratified or approved
said alleged sale of said tomatoes to the said complainants
or to any of them.
Your respondent distinctly avers and charges that to
consummate a sale of any of the trust property, and
[36] particularly the tomatoes in, question, was a duty re
quiring the exercise of the trustee's judgment and dis
cretion, and that the said trustee could not, even if he would,
lawfully delegate the duties requiring the exercise of personal
judgment and d'scretion. ^
(5) Your respondent does not admit the correctness of
the indebtedness set out in paragraph 5 of the bill of the
complainants. The said J. H. Arrington was, at the time of
the execution of said deed, largely indebted to a great many
creditors, a large number of whom have never been made
parties to this su't, and some of the creditors and the amounts
due them are not set forth in said paragraph five of said bill.
(6) In answer to paragraph six of said bill, your re
spondent says, admitting that the allegaions contained there
in are true, at appears on the face of the said bill that the
said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, did not exercise his non-
delegable duties, and that the approval of some of the parties
to the trust of the act of an agent is not binding upon the
trust or the trust estate.
(7) Your respondent denies that the alleged contract
entered into between the said John L. Abbot and the said
complainants was fair and equitable, and if such contract is
allowed to be enforced, there will be a great loss to the said
J. H. Arrington and possibly to his creditors. "While the
price of the tomatoes^ at the time of the alleged contract
was very low, the market price of such tomatoes at this time
ranges from $1.00 to $1.10 per dozen cans, and there will be a
loss to the said J. H. Arrington, and possibly to his creditors,
of between four and five thousand dollars if the said J. H.
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Arrington and his creditors only receive sixty-nine cents per
dozen cans for the said tomatoes. It is true that within a
few days after the alleged contract was signed between the
said complainants and the said John L. Abbot, the said Ar
rington refused to deliver the said goods to the said com
plainants.
(8) It is true that your respondent, on the 17th day of
August 1921, was appointed and qualified as substi-
[37] tuted trustee in the room, place and stead of the said
S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, with full powers to execute
the said trust in accordance with the terms of the said deed
of trust.
(9) It is furthermore true that default was made in
the payment of the debt secured to Evelyn Arrington, and that
the said Hunter Miller, trustee, sold the property conveyed to
him and to the said Lambeth, trustee, and out of the proceeds
of the said sale, paid the debt secured in said deedj leaving a
balance in the hands of the said Miller, trustee, which was
turned over to your respondent, of about $2000.00.
(10) It is furthermore true that your respondent has
refused to deLver the tomatoes to the complainants in ac
cordance with the terms of the alleged contract between the
said Arrington ard the said complainants, because no valid
contract has been entered into between the said parties, and
the title to the said tomatoes was vested in your respondent
as substituted trustee, and to comply with said alleged con
tract might cause a loss to the said creditors of the said J.
H. Arrington, and in any event, the) said J. H. Arrington
will suffer great loss thereby.
(11) As to the allegations contained in paragraph
eleven of the biP, your respondent is unable to say definitely
whether or not the assets of the sa'd J. H. Arrington will be
sufficient to pay all of the creditors in full. Your respond
ent, however, emphatically denies that the said J. H. Arring^
ton or the said John L. Abbot had a right to make a sale of
the said tomatoes to the said complainants or to anyone else.
Your respondent furthermore denies the allegation that
the creditors of the said J. H. Arrington will make no objec
tion to the said contract being executed, when, as a matter
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of fact, nearly all of the creditors, except the complainants
in this bill, ha\re objected to the confirmation of such sale. •
Further answering, your respondent avers and charges
that the complainant, C. W. Gills, attempted to pur-
[38] chase the tomatoes in question for himself and the
other complainants for the purpose of reselling the
same at a profit; that the market price of tomatoes at this
time varies from $1.00 to $1.10 per dozen cans, causing a loss
to the creditors of J. H. Arrington, and to the said J. H. Ar-
rington of between four and five thousand dollars.
Your respondent, further answering, says that neither
the said G. W. Gills nor any of the complainants have paid
for the tomatoes involved in these proceedings.
And now having fully answered, your respondent prays
to be hence dismissed with his reasonable costs in this behalf
expended.
LANDONLOWRY,
Trustee.
Demurrer and Answer of J. H. Arrington
This defendant demurs to the bill of the said complain
ants and says that the same is not sufficient in law, and for
the grounds of his said demurrer adopts the same as are set
forth in the demurrer of the said Landon Lowry, trustee, this
day filed.
And for answer unto the said bill or to so much thereof
as your respondent is advised it is necessary or material he
make answer, answers and says:
That the matters and things set up in the answer to the
said bill of the said complainants by the said Landon Lowry,
trustee, this day filed, are true, and. that the said answer cor
rectly sets forth the defenses of this respondent to said bill,
and your respondent therefore adopts the said answer as his
own to the said bill.
Further answering, your respondent avers that he is a
farmer residing in Bedford County, Virginia, and for several
years was, in addition to farming, engaged in the canning of
tomatoes in a cannery located on his farm.
That in the year 1920, he purchased from one Evelyn Ar
rington a farm at the price of $13,356.00, paid $4452.00 cash,
at the time of the purchase, and executed a deed of trust for
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tbe deferred payments of the purchase money to one Hunter
Miller and one S. S. Lambeth, Jr., Trustees. In addition to
owning this farm, your respondent owned a farm of 120
acres, on which he now resides.
In the year 1920 your respondent engaged very extensive
ly in the canning of tomatoes and contracted with his
[39] neighbors to furnish him tomatoes at the price of
seventy-five cents per bushel, the total amount of the
purchase price for the tomatoes being the sum of $ .
That to carry on this business it became necessary for
your respondent to buy a large numer of cans, which he did
buy from the Bedford Can Company, the total amount of his
purchase for this purpose being nearly the sum of $5,000.00.
It also became necessary for him to borrow large sums
of money from the Peoples National Bank of Bedford, Vir
ginia, to carry on the business.
At the time he began preparations for the canning sea
son of 1920, and'entered into contracts with the growers to
raise tomatoes, and with the Bedford Can Company to fur
nish cans'. No. 2 tomatoes were selling at or about $1.30 per
dozen cans, and had the market remained staple your re
spondent would not have become financially embarrassed and
would have had amp^e funds to settle in full with all of h's
-creditors, and it would not have be"n necessary for him to
have made a d'^ed of assignment as he d'd do on the 9th day
of November 1x20, to said S. S. Lambeth, Jr, trustee.
When the canning season ended in the fall of 1920, your
respondent had on hand about seventy-five hundred cases of
canned tomatoes, and even if tomatoes had been selling at
only one dollar per dozen cans, at that time, your respondent
would have received about $15,000.00 for his tomatoes. As a
matter of fact, however, the prices of canned tomatoes con
stantly declined after the canning season was over, and thete
was no market for them, except at a great loss.
In the fall of 1920, after the canning season was over, and
before any tomatoes had been sold, and there was no market
for them your respondient's indebtedness was about $30,-
000.00, which included the balance of the purchase price for
the land purchased by him, the purchase price of the
[40] cans used in his canning factory,.borrowed money from
the bank, hire for labor in operating his factory, etc.
The creditors of your respondent were demanding a set-
ttement of their respective debts, and while your respondent
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owned a large quantity of personal property, .he.was unable to
sell anything or to borrow any more money, and it became
necessary, in order to avoid a large number of suits, for your
respondent to make a deed of assignment, whereby all of the
property of your respondent,? real and personal, was con
veyed to the said Lambeth, trustee, for the purpose of se
curing the debts due to his said creditors.
The said trustee took possession of the trust property
and was arranging with the creditors to pay them certain
proportions of their indebtedness from time to time, and en
deavoring to hold the canned tomatoes nntil the price should
advance sufficiently to justify a sale of them.
In the month of January 1921, on account of the illness
of the said trustee, it became necessary for him to leave the
State of Virginia, and from that time to the present, •said
S. S. Lambeth, Jr., has made no contract with reference to
the trust estate, nor "has he exercised any control over the
same.
• It is true that -the said Lambeth at the time he left Bed
ford put John L. Abbot in charge of his business affairs gen
erally, including the handling of the affairs of your respond
ent. Your respondent did not object to this, thinking that the
said Lambeth would return to his office and take charge of
the same within a few months at the most, and at that time
there was no urgent or pY-essing action to be taken by the
trustee.
The said trustee did not return, and the creditors were
insistent that their bills be paid, and having no funds to meet
the purchase money notes then past due for the land pur
chased from Evelyn Arrington, Hunter Miller, trustee, adver
tised and sold the said farm, and the amount realized was
only a few hundred dollars more than the debt due thereon.
The taxes for the year 1920 had not been paid and the
[41] Treasurer was dem?niding a settlement of the same,
and the demands of the creditors in the summer of
1921 were so insistent, and having no funds with which to
pay them, your respondent became desperate and in order to
raise funds, did sign the contract for the sale of the tomatoes
in question to said C. W. Gills. He did this reluctantly and
against his best judgment, and at the great solicitation of the
said Gills wha repeatedly told your respondent that the price
named in the contract was all he could expect to get for them.
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The said CC. W. Gills .was a large owner of stock of the Bed
ford Can Company, and the President of the Company, and
he was insisting that the debt due by your jrespondent to the
rsaid Bedford Can Company be paid, and in fact, your re
spondent thought he was selling to the Bedford Can Com
pany and not to C. W. Gills, individually, or to the individual
jnembers of the Company, since the said C. W. Gills and sev-
veral members of the firm, just prior to the attempted sale in
question, had on several occasions gone to the factory of your
respondent and inspected his canned tomatoes.
Your respondent further avers that the said C. W. Gills
purchased or undertook to purchase the said tomatoes for
himself and the other complainants for the purpose of Re
selling the same at a profit.
Your respondent further answering says, that within a
few days after the contract in question had been signed, he
realized that he had done an illegal act in signing said con
tract, and especially since S. S. Lambeth, Jr., .the trustee, had
not made the sale, ratified or approved it, and your respond
ent being advised under the c rcumstances he had no right to
sell the tomatoes to the said C. W. Gills, or to any one else,
did, therefore, as alleged in the bill of the complainants, re
fuse to deliver same to him; and that it is not true that at the
time of his refusal to deliver said tomatoes the price had ad
vanced, and that was his reason for his failure to make de
livery.
Further answering your respondent says he has neither
the legal title to nor the possession of the said tomatoes, and
that he has no right to call for the legal title or the
[42] possession from the trustee, and that he did not have
the title thereto or the possession at the time of the
said alleged contract.
Your respondent further avers and charges that in view
of all the facts and circumstances connected with this case,
it would be inequitable, unjust and oppressive to require him
to specifically perform the alleged contract sued on, and he,
therefore, respectfully prays that this suit may be dismissed.
And now having fully answered, your respondent prays
to be hence dismissed with his reasonable costs in this behalf
expended.
J. H. ARRINGTON.
• • 49_ ^
Answer of H. Sowerby and Others
Your respondents H. Sowerby, J. A. Noell, J. R. Toms,
J. R. Watson, Watson Brothers, Ray Arrington, W. B. Hurt,
Burks-Ramsey Supply Company, Fancy Farm Roller Mills,
Campbell-Rucker, Parker-Ayres Company, Incorporated,
Berta Coles, Clemmie Toms, and Mrs. J. Carrie Toms, for
answer unto the bill of the said complainants, or so much
thereof as they are advised it is necessary and material for
them to make answer, answer and say:
That they are creditors of the defendant, J. H. Arring
ton, and that their debts are secured in the deed of trust made
by the said J. H. Arringtom to S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee.
Further answering, your respondents say that they know
nothing of the trust or falsity of the avennents contained in
the bill of the said complainants, but they are satisfied with
the substituted trustee's administration of the estate, and
desire him to proceed to administer it.
And now having fully answered, your respondents pray
to be hence dismissed with their reasonable costs in this be
half expended.
And at anoter day, to-wit:
At Bedford Circuit Court the 31st day of May 1922.
This day tliis cause came on to be heard upon the bill of
the complainant, the demurrer and answer of .J. H.
[43] Arrington and Landon Lowry, trustee, the answers of
H. Sowerby, J. A. Noell, J. R. Toms, J. R. Watson,
Watson Brothers, Ray Arrington, W. B. Hurt, Burks-Ram»-
sey Supply Company, Fancy Farm Roller Mills, Campbell-
Rucker, Parker-Ayres Company, Inc , Berta Coles, Clemmie
Toms and Mrs. J. Carrie Toms, to which the complainants
replied generally, the testimony of witnesses which was taken
at the hearing on the law side of this Court and made a part
of the record by the order heretofore entered, and was argued
by counsel.
And the Court desiring time to consider of its opinion,
doth adjudge order and decree that this cause be submitted
to the Judge of this Court for such decision and decree in va
cation as might be made in term time, and leave is granted
the parties to this suit ten days in which to file any additional
answers or other pleadings as they may deem necessary.
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Answer of Bedford Can Company, Inc.
Your respondent, the Bedford Can Co., Inc., for answer
nnto the bill of complainants, or to much thereof as it is ad
vised it is necessary it should answer, answers and says:
That J. H. Arrington is indebted to your respondent in
the sum of about $5,200.00. Your respondent is informed
that there are no other, large creditors of J. H. Arrington ex
cept the Peoples National Bank of Bedford, Virginia, and
that this respondent's debt and the debt of the Peoples
National Bank constitute by far the largest part of the in
debtedness due by the said J. H. Arrington. This respond
ent is informed that the said J. H. Arrington has enough pro
perty to pay all of his debts and will have a considerable
amount left (and this respondent and the said Peoples Na
tional Bank have, in fact, agreed that the said trustee may
pay the smaller creditors first, and a large part of the small
creditors have been paid) but this fact caniiot be definitely
determ'ned until the trust as-set forth in the bill has
[44] been executed, and this respondent therefore prays
that this Court may direct the said Landon Lowry,
trustee, to proceed to execute the said trust in order that the
rights of the said creditors and the other parties interested
may be determined.
And now having fully aniswered, this respondent prays
to be hence dism'ssed, with its reasonable costs by it in this
behalf expended.
Opinion of the Court
On the 9th day of November 1920, J. IT. Arrington and
wife conveyed to S. S. Lambeth, trustee, a -large amount of
property in the County of Bedford, to secure a large indebt
edness due by said Arrington, which said deed was duly re
corded in the C-erk's Office. The powers of the trustee under
this deed are very oomprehensive. He is authorized to use
his discretion and sell the property privately or publicly, and
employ people to assist him in the management of such estate.
Mr. Lambeth, however, some time after the execution of this
trust, and after he had assumed his duties as trustee was
tE^ken ill and left the County of Bedford in January 1921,
with Mr. John Abbot, an attorney practicing in Bedford, in
charge of his office, and with plenary powers to transact the
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business of said Lambeth, without specifically authorizing
hiTTi to act as trustee for Mm. Subsequent to this date, to-
wit, on the —^— day of •, 1921, Landon Lowry, an
other attorney practicing at this Court, was substituted in
the place of said Lambeth as trustee, with full powers to exe
cute said trust in accordance with the terms of said deed.
Pending the time, however, when John Abbot was acting in
the stead of Lambeth, trustee, the said J. H. Arriiigton, with
the approval of and the consent of the said Abbot, sold to
complainants in this cause—C. W. Gills, G. M. Wigington,
George W. Johnson and J. T. Davidson—^7500 cases of
canned tomatoes, and on the 17th day of July, 1921, entered
into a memorandum of agreement, s-gned by Gills, John L.
Abbot, agent for S. S. Lambeth, trustee, and J. H. Arrington,
the grantor in the deed of trust, upon the terms and condi
tions prescribed in the written memorandum filed with
[45] the papers in this cause. According to the evidence
in the case, the plaintiffs made a demand on Arrington
for the delivery of the goods bought, and he refused to de
liver the same, and when Lowry qualified as substituted trus
tee, he likewise refused to deliver said canned tomatoes, and
the plaintiffs instituted an action of detinue iii this Court for
the recovery of the same against Landon Lowry, trustee, who
was in possession of said trmatoes, but upon the hearing of
said action of detinue, at the December Term 1921, the Court
being of opinion that a trust being involved^ and the plain
tiff's rights indefinite and undetermined, that a Court of law
was not the proper forum; that the action should be transferr
ed to the equity side of the Court, and the plaintiff's given
ten days in which to file his bill m chancery to conform to the
views of the Court in relation to the prosecution of their
claim, and that the evidence taken and exhibits filed in the
common law proceedings be made a part of the record and
transferred to the chancery side of this Court.
The .plaintiffs, in pursuance of the order of the Court,
filed their bill in chancery, on the 31st day of December 1921,
in which they alleged ^li the facts and details in relation to
their purchase, claiming that John Abbot was authorized by
the terms of the deed of trust, and by the authority vested in
him by Lambeth, to sell them the tomiatoes, and that whether
he was so authorized or not, that J. H. Arrington, the grantor
in the deed of trust, and the owner of the property, signed
the written agreement, and that whether Abbot had the right
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or not, Arrington did have, certainly as far as his beneficial
interest was concerned, in the property embraced in the deed
of trust. They allege that they bought the property from
Arrington and Abbot; that they both signed the agreement
and that the property in the deed of trust other than the to
matoes is amply sufficient to pay off all the other debts which
said Arrington intended to be secured thereby, and that this
property which they bought, to-wit, the tomatoes, having been
sold to them by Arrington, that they have all of his rights
and title to the same; that they are entitled to the protection
of the Court in requiring the trustee to exhaust all oth-
[46] er property embraced in said deed in paying off the
debts, to the exoneration of the tomatoes aforesaid.
That while said trustee should not be required to do anything
detrimental to the interests of the creditors secured, still he
is the agent both of the creditors and of the grantors, and that
it is his duty to protect the crediors in the payment their
debt, while at the same time he is required to use his best
efforts to conserve the property and protect the interest of
the grantor in the same, so far as it does not conflict with the
rights of the crciditors, and that the complainants stand now
in relation to the deed of trust and the tomatoes that Arring
ton stood before he soM them to them, and that while it may
be that they have no r'ght to the tomatoes, if it endangered
the debt secured, they certa'nly have the r'ght to them after
the debts are secured by a sale of the other property of the
said Arrington. They ask that the trustee be required to ad
minister the trust under the supervision of the Court, and to
ascertain and inform the Court whether or not the debts can
be paid by the property embraced in the deed of trust other
than the tomatoes. The creditors are all made parties to the
bill and Arrington is likewise made a party and said bill is
demurred to by the trustee, Landon Lowry.
The grounds of tlie d-^murrer are very numerous, cover
ing several pages of typewritten legal cap paper. The first
ground of demurrer is that it is a suit for the specific per
formance of contract for the sale of personal property, having
no pretium affection!s and states no case of irreparable in
jury for the alleged breach of contract, but on the other hand
shows on its face that the purchase was made by the com
plainants for the purpose of a resale at a profit. The sul>ject
matter of the contract was canned tomatoes, possessing no
unique/ characteristics, and that such articles are ordinary
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articles of barter and sale, readily procurable in the market.
That the remedy of the complainants is full, adequate and
sufficient in a Court of law for damages, if they are entitled
to damages, for the alleged breach of the contract set up
in the bill. Various authorities are referred to by the attor
ney as substantiating his position.
It is not denied that the principal as stated in the de
murrer is generally accepted as sound, where specific per
formance is the sole object of the bill, but it is plain to
[47] my mind, after carefully reading the bill and making a
close study of this case, that it is not a case of specific
performance pure,and simple, but it is one more in the nature
of a discovery or disclosure from the trustee by requiring him
to settle his account and show whether or not the beneficial
interest of Arrington in the tomatoes which the plaintiffs
bought, amounts to anything, w:hether or not the creditors
will be prejudiced by a delivery of these goods to the pur
chasers from Arrington and whether or not the trustee had a
right to withhold them after it has been determined that he
had sufficient assets in his hands to pay off all the creditors,
without interfering with the sale made by Arrington to these
plaintiffs.
The learned attorney seems to think if these people have
any remedy at a^l, it is m a court of law, and that his only
right is to recover damages for a breach of the contract on
the part of Arrington in his refusal "to comply with the terms
thereof.
I have no doubt that these people could, if they had seen
proper, waived their right to the property and proceeded in a
suit for damages, after it was determined that the beneficial
interests of Arrington belonged to them, but they are not
bound to do this.
The legal title to tli's property was vested in tliem when
they bought it, and a person is not bound to g ve up his
property and sue for a breach of the contract. "Where there
is an unconditional contract, as in this case, for the sale of
goods in a deliverable state, the title to the goods in the pro
perty passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is
immaterial whether the time of payment or time of delivery,
or both, be postponed. Goods are in a deliverable state when
they are in such a state that the buyei' would under the con
tract be bound to take delivery of them. Now the authority
for this position is unmistakable. See Benjamin on sales
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page 69; Decker vs. Furniss 14 N. Y., 611 and other cases
there cited, and last but not least, Chapman vs. Campbell, 13
Grat, page 105.
It is well settled, in my opinion, at common law that in a
sale of property under these conditions, the property im
mediately vests in the buyer and the right, to the price in the
seller, unless it appears that such was not the intention of
the parties. The language of the Supreme Court of Virginia,
in the case referred to of Chapman vs. Campbell, is as fol
lows: "Any words importing a bargain whereby the owner
of the chattel signifies his mllingness to consent to
[48] sell, and whereby another person shall signify his wil
lingness to consent to buy it, in presenti, for a specific
price, would be a sale and transfer of the right to the chattel,
and neither the delivery or tender of the property, nor the
payment or tender of the purchase money, is necessary to
constitute the contract." This was the case of a slave who
was in Court to be tr'ed for an offence, and the court told the
master he would let the negro off with slight punishment if
he would move him out of the country, and the purchaser
Chapman thereupon told the owner of the slave, who agreed
with the Court to dispose of h'm, that he would accept his
proposition and pay h'm $800.00 for the slave. The slave was
sent back to jail and that n'ght he escaped, and the po'nt was
made that there was no delivery, and suit being brought by
the seller against the purchaser for the price, to-wit $800.00
of the slave, the court decreed the title in the purchaser to
require payment by the purchaser. The case is directly, on
the point, in which the Court held that it was not necessary
either for the payment of the money or the delivery for the
maintenance of a suit to recover specific property, the legal
title being in the plaintiff. This Court is still of opinion that
it was proper to transfer this case to the chancery side of
the Court, because it involves pure and s.-mple the settlement
of this trust matter, and a court of law never has .iurisdict^on
when a trust is Invoked, but even if there be a right to sue
at law, the remedy in equity is concurrent and m^uch more
complete. .
The whole right of the plaintiffs here depends entirely
upon the answer to their inquiry of the trusteie as to
[49] whether or not there is any beneficial interest in J. H.
Arrington in the goods which the plaintiffs, purchased
of him and John L. Abbot, acting trustee.
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If there is no such beneficial interest, why they may not
be able to maintain their suit, and they have no other way of
finding out.
The trustee seems to be hostile to theni and the only way
that they can get at this matter at all is by requiring the trus
tee to come into court and disclose what assets he has to pay
off the debts and relieve the property of these people from
the liability of the deed of trust, so df it be a suit for specific
performance in some of its ramifications it is likewise one
calling for things which make a specific performance merely
anciQary relief. They must know first whether or not they
are entitled to this property, and if they are entitled to it,
then they are entitled to ask the Court to require the trustee
to deliver.it to them, and a Court of equity having once ac
quired jurisdiction of their equities, will go on and grant com
plete relief, and if it is shown that this property belongs to
these plaintiffs, after settlement of these trust matters, the
Court would be in error to send them back to a Court of law,
but should do complete justice in the matter by delivery of
the property upon payment of the money due into Court, or
to the trustee. This matter is thoroughly settled by the
Supreme Court, and the last case on the subject that I find
is Brown vs. Ford, 120 Virginia, page 233, so this ground of
demurrer is overruled.
The second ground of demurrer is that the bill shows
that the alleged sale of the tomatoes was not made or con
firmed by the trustee, and that this was a non-delegable duty,
requring the exerc'se of his personal judgment and discre
tion, and that, therefore, the contract alleged is void as to the
trustee, and his successor in trust. This is rather an anomal
ous position to be taken by the trustee. So far as Arrington
is concerned, these people stand in his shoes if they are the
bona fide purchasers, and there is no doubt of that. Mr. Ab
bot is a man whom we aU Impw to be one of high character, an
intelligent lawyer, and whether he had the power of a trustee
or not, when the sale was made, he did it with the full
[50] concurrence and approbation of Arrington, to whom
the property belonged. In other words, if the balance
of the property would bring the debt, why as a matter of
course the trustee would be required to turn this, property
back to Arrington, and he has sold it, why should he not^e
required to turn it over the parties who have purchased it?
Mr. Abbot's testimony is clear and distinct. The sale was
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made after deliberate consultation between him and Arring-
totf, and that Arrington approved of it and insisted upon it
bein^ made, and there is no reason whatever as I can see why
he should be released from his contract. If he did sell at a
low price he did it advisedly. He was in consultation with the
acting trustee, a man of a high order of intelligence and char
acter who knew the situation of his affairs, and knew he was
needing money, and that it would be a large amount towards
the payment cf his debts, amounting to something like
$9,000.00 (See Shepherd vs. Darling, 120 Virginia, page 586,
where it is said "where a beneficiary dealing with a trustee
has sought independent advice from a person competent to
advise as to the particular transaction, this fact will go far
to give assurance of its fairness and to induce a Court of
equity to uphold it") and will almost leave the balance of his
property, after paying off the first deed of trust, in his hands
unencumbered, as is shown by proof, that is other lands which
have not been sold and now in his possession, are amply suffi
cient to pay off his debts. He is worth from $15,000.00 to
$20,000.00. The question is not without authority in Virginia.
The Court plainly lays down the duty of a trustee, that he is
agent of bo,th parties, and n the case of Hammond vs. Ridley,
116 Virginia,, page 393-399, inclusive, decides the very propo
sition that is involved here. In that case Hammond conveyed
his equitable interest to Ridley as security for a debt, and
subsequently conveyed the same interest, subject to his home
stead, to a trustee to secure his general creditors. He paid
the debt to Ridley, and at his instance the trustee in the deed
for the benefit of the general creditors, made a deed of release
to Ridley, who held a legal title, and it was objected by Rid
ley*s Executor that the trustee had no right to make the re
lease. The Court said this "whatever effect, if any,
[51] that release had, inured, not to the personal benefit of
Ridley, who held the legal title, but to him as trustee
and to his cestui que trust, at whose instance and for whose
benefit it was made in order to get the legal title then out
standing in the trustees united with the legal title then in
Ridley,*' and hence the executor had no right to raise the
question. The Court, in its opinion says this. The deed of
trust to secure creditors does not divest the grantor of all
his interest in the property conveyed. His beneficial interest
continues, subject to the liability of the debt secured, and he
can further encumber it by mortgage to secure his creditors.
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This is directly in point. In fact, it seems to me to be folly to
say that Arrington here in this case had no right to sell his
beneficial interest, if he saw proper. I am very sure that he
did have it. It is true the complainants are not the creditors
secured by the deed of trust, and have never established any
claim against the trust estate, but they are interested to the
same extent that Arrington was
had purchased. It is not necesss
bill should show the averment
dishonest administration of the t
its face that the trustee would not comply with their request
or inform them as to what property was there to pay off the
debts against the tomatoes, and while it is considered by the
Court that it was the trustee's duty to have brought suit to
settle these matters, if he refus^ to do so, these parties had
a perfect right to bring it, and while the trustee has not acted
fraudulently or dishonestly in his administration of the trust,
and while the trust may be discretionary in some respects,
the best of us some time act illegally, and the Court here holds
that the trustee should have brought this suit in his own name
in the tomatoes which they
ry; in my judgment that the
•f an illegal, fraudulent or
rust, but it shows plainly on
and had the Court to determ ne these questions before he ad
ministered the estate. He could not dictate to these people
that they should have brought a suit for damages at law. It
is true they are not crediars, but they are not bound to bring
a suit, as is shown, to establish their damages, and it is
[52] true no other party is seeking the administration of
this trust through a Court of equity, but they have
rights here wh'ch are involved in this matter, and all the
creditors are before the Court, and no one seems to make any
objection to what they are ask'ng for, except the grantor Ar
rington, and the trustee representing him as his counsel. The
contention here that they must iirst establish their claim in a
Court of law, I think, has been fully answered. They could
not establish their c^a m in n Court of law until they knew
what their contingent interests are, they could not possibly
ascertain by a suit for damages in a court of law. If they
had brought the suit for damages, they would have been met
with just the objection that meets them here. You have no
right to these tomatoes superior to that of the creditors. If
it takes the tomatoes to pay off the creditors, then you haven't
bought anything from Arrington at all, and that could not be
determined without the settlement of the trustee's account.
The largest creditors in the concern, which is the Bedford
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Canning Company, which is due about $5,200.00, files its
ainswer, in which it says that the said Arrington has ample
property' to' pay all of his debts, and have a considerable
amount left, and that this Company and the Peoples National
Bank, who also own another large debt, had agreed that the
trustee may pay the smaller creditors first, though they are
not preferred, and a larger part of the small creditors have
already been paid, and they joined in the prayer of the bill
that said Lowry, trustee, may be required to execute the trust
and that the rights of the creditors and other parties may be
determined.
Now, if the trustee declined to bring suit, then anybody
interested, these people being in Arring-ton's shoes, have a
right to bring it. This is settled in the case of Byrd vs. Byrd,
where it is expressly stated that it is the trustee *s duty to
bring the suit, and if he doesn't do it, why anybody else in
terested in the suit may br'ng it, to have the questions de
termined. See also Glenn vs. Augusta Perpetual .&c. Com
pany, 99 Virginia, page 699, where the Court states as fol
lows : There can be no serious question as to the jurisdiction
of a Court of equity in a case like this. Indeed it
[53] would have been improper for the trustee to expose the
property to sale without having first removed the cloud
cast upon the title. The language of Moncure J. in Russet vs.
Fisher, 11 Grat, 499, reaffirmed m Preston vs. Stuart, 29
Grat. 303, may be approT)riately quoted in this connection:
"He, the trustee, is bound to bring the estate to the hammer,
as is said by Lord EMon, under every possible advantage to a
cestui que trust, and he should use all reasonable diligence to
obtain the best prices, Hill on Trustees, 479, and cases cited.
He may and ought of h's own motion to apply to a Court of
equity to remove impediment to a fair execution of his trust,
to remove any cloud hang'rg over the title and to adjust any
accounts that are necessary in order to ascertain the actual
amount which ought to be ra'sed by the sale to meet the en
cumbrances.
Another ground of demurrer is that the contract shows
neither mutuality of remedy or obligation. The contract al
leged is with only one of the complainants, and so this defend
ant could not have had specific performance of the contract,
in any event, against any of the complainants, except C. W.
•Gills. Had the goods been tendered to C. W. Gills and he re
fused to receive them, this defendant's remedy would have
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been by action at law for the contract price, or loss sustained,'
if any, when reselling at the risk of C. W. Gills. It is perfect
ly plain that this memorandum of contract was made by Gills,
but the sale was, as proved, to the parties who are complain
ants in this action, and the memorandum, though only signed
by Gills, was a direct, express sale of the goods by Arrington
and Abbot to Gills, representing himself and his co-complain
ants. The remedy surely of the trustee, if he had sued Gills
for non-compliance, would not have been for damages at all
for breach of the contract, but would certainly have been for
the money due, to-wit: $9,000.00 and some dollars, as the
purchase price of the tomatoes, regardles of what he might
have gone upon the market and bought them for.
Sixth: The complainants do not allege that the purchase
price for the tomatoes alleged to have been sold and pur
chased by them has been, nor is there a tender with the bill
of the purchase price therefor. The authorities al-
[54] rea(iy cited show that th's ground of demurrer is not
tenable. The Court will see to it that these parties, if
they are entitled to these tomatoes, will pay the money to the
trustee, or wherever it belongs.
In fact the 'nstant case illustrates the incongruous posi
tion taken by the Attorney for Arrin^on. There are two
deeds of trust, both of which are upon some of the same pro
perty. The first deed of trust has been executed and there
was a surplus after paying the debt in full. This money, with
out question, was paid by Miller, trustee to Lowry, trustee in
the second deed. No one will doubt that this was proper and
no one will doubt either that but for the second deed of trust,
this money which was paid to Lowry trustee, would by opera
tion of law have had to be paid to Arrington, grantor in both
deeds, by Miller the trustee in the first deed, and surely if it
belonged to Arring*ton, he could do what he pleased with it.
That $200 00 or whatever it was, paid by Miller, trustee to
Lowry trustee, was no more Arrington's money than these to
matoes were his, if there is anything in the deed to pay the
debt without them.
The analogy is irresistable thatj these tomatoes under
the authorities recited belonged to Arrington and he can do
as he pleases with them, if there is enough in the deed of trust
to pay his debts without them, and the trustee is clearly bound
by his'duty as such to protect these people who are the hold-
6a •
ers of Arrington's rights in the premises as they would be to
protect Arrington, if he did not sell them. The trustee can
have no doubt in his mind that this was a bona fide sale by
Arrington and Abbot trustee to Gills. Arrington was not
acting unadvisedly, but he was acting, so far as he is con
cerned, in conjunction with the trustee, because he has recog
nized Abbot as the trustee all the way through, and is es
topped from denying his rights in the premises. The trustee
knew the character of Mr. Abbot, that he was a lawyer of a
high order of intelligence and a man of strict integrity, and
that his advice was followed by Arrington in the sale that
he made. There is not the slightest intention of fraud or un
due influence in this matter, and these plaintiffs had no other
remedy, in my judgment, than the one they are pursuing
now.
Another anomalous position assumed by counsel for Mr.
Arrington is that if he had sued Gills, he could have re-
i[55] covered the purchase price of thei tomatoes, but
couldn't have recovered it from the other plaintiffs, be
cause they do not appear as parties to the contract. The first
incongruity about this is assuredly if he had a right to sue
Gills for the purchase money, then Gills would have a right
to pay the purchase money and take the property, which re
futes his argument that-Gills wouM have to sue for damages
as his only remedy, because if he can sue for the purchase
price, then GUIs can sue fpr the possession of the property.
Again, what difference does it make in this case whether the
other parties are responsible under the contract or not which
as a matter of fact they really are. The money is here
brought into Court and it has to be pa'd before the money
could ever be turned over, and if there is any reason in the
law as an abstract proposition that they could be made liable,
the law ceases when the reason ceases. There can be no ques
tion here whatever but that these tomatoes will be pa'd for
before they are ever delivered to the purchasers. The de
murrer is, therefore, overi-u^ed.
The answer of the trustee is almost a reiteration of the
points made in his demurrer. He says it may be to the preju
dice of the creditors, and certainly to the great detriment of
Arrington, that these people be allowed to enforce their con
tract. So far as the creditors are concerned, they are under
the protection of the Court, but the trustee acting as agent
for both parties, cannot in this case, in iny judgment, assume
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the cudgel for Arringon. Whether Arrington sold his pro
perty unadvisedly or not, he has certainly sold it, and there
is not the slightest imputation of fraud or undue influence,
or anything else, that would induce a Court to relieve him
from the consequences of his contract. He answers the bill,
also Arrington does, and admits he signed the paper, but says
he didn't have any right to do it, and his only excuse is that
he was hard run and wanted to raise money. When he sold
the tomatoes he was raising something like $9,€00.00. and if
that had been applied to his debts, according to the
[56]. evidence, there would have been a small amount com
paratively yet to be paid, while ho is in possession of
his home and other property, which would be relieved to the
extent of the $9,000.00 or whatever the sum is.
There may be a decree in this case, therefore, overruling
the demurrer and referring the matter to a Commissioner to
settle the account of the trustee and to report to this Court at
the next term thereof whether or not it is necessary to subject
these tomatoes to sale under the said deed of trust, in order
for the payment of the debts thereby secured and whether
the property of Arrington embraced in the deed and yet un
sold is of itself sufficient to pay off said indebtedness, leaving
the toiaatoes to be applied in pursuance of the contract of
Arrington.
And at another day, to-wit:
At Bedford Circuit Court July 19tk, 1922.
This day this cause came on to be again heard on the
papers formerly read and the answer of the Bedford Can Co.,
Inc., which was filed within ten days from the time at which
the last decree was entered in this suit, and the Court after
taking time to consider of its opinion, doth overrule the de
murrers of J. H. Arr'ngton and Landon Lowry, filed in this
suit, and the Court bslng further of the opinion that under
the terms of the contract between J. H. Arrington and S. S.
Lambeth, Jr., trustee, by John L. Abbot, his agent, of the one
part and C. W. Gills of the other part, the said J. H. Arring
ton made sale of all interest which he might have in the
canned tomatoes in the possession of said Lambeth, trustee,
estimated to be 7500 cases, but the general trust under wMeh
the said Lambeth was acting not having been completed either
by him or Landon Lowry, his successor, the Court has no evi-
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dence to show whether or not the remaining property of the
said J. H. Arrington will be sufficient to pay his debts, leaving
the said canned tomatoes free from debt, as shown in a writ
ten opinion, which is made a part of the record, doth adjudge,
order and decree that this cause be referred to one of the
Commissioners of this Court to take, state, settle and
[57] report to the Court the following accounts:
(1) An account showing the transactions of S. S. Lam
beth, Jr., trustee, under the general deed of assignment of
J. H. Arrington.
(2) An account of the transactions of Landon Lowry,
substituted trustee under the said deed of assignment.
(3) An account showing what property, both real and
personal, of the said J. H. Arrington is still in the hands of
the said Landon Lowry, unsold, and the value of the same.
(4) What debts of the said J. H. Arrington remain un
paid.
(5) Any other account any of the parties to this' suit
may request and the Commissioner taking the same may deem
pertinent.
And at another day,to-wit:
At Bedford Circuit Court July 18th, 1923.
This day came S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, and asked
leave to file his petition in the chancery suit of C. W. Grills et
als V. Landon LoWry trustee et als, and leave being granted,
the same is accordingly filed, nunc pro tune, as of July 2nd,
1923, the date of the actual filing of saM petition; and came
also C. W. CriUs, G. M. Wigington, George W. Johnson and
J. T. Davidson, by counsel, and asked like leave to file their
demurrer and answer to said petition, and leave being grant
ed, the same is accordinglyfiled. And camealso J. H. Arring
ton and Landon Lowry trustee, by counsel, and asked leave
to file their separate answers to said petition, and leave being_
granted, the same are accordingly filed, service of process
having been waived by all of said parties.
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Petition
Your petitioner, S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee as herein
after set forth, respectfully shows unto the Court the fol
lowing case.
On the 9th day of November 1920, J. Howard Arrington
and Mollie A. Arrington, his wife, executed to the said S. S.
Lambeth, Jr., trustee, a deed of assignment for the benefit of
the creditors of the said J. Howard Arrington, a copy
[58] whereof is filed in the suit of C. W. Oills and others
against Landon Lowry, trustee and others as exhibit
B, with the bill of complaint, in which suit leave is also asked
to file this petition. Reference to said deed of trust and to
the bill and proceedings in the above styled suit is herewith
made.
Shortly after the execution of the deed of assignment,
said trustee suffered what may be described in common par
lance as a nervous breakdown, by reason whereof, he left
the County of Bedford, and also the State of Virginia, in
search of health. Petitioner was for several months in Flori
da, and thereafter in April 1921, he became a patient at High
land Hospital in Asheville, N. C. Petitioner had not however,
resigned his pos'tion as trustee under said deed of trust. By
contract dated July 17th, 1921, and signed by C. W. Gills,
John L. Abbot, agent for S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee and J.
H. Arrington, all of the merchantable tomatoes in J. H. Ar
rington's factory were sold to the said C. W. Gills at 69 cents
net for No. 2's and 105 cients net for No. 3's. Petitioner was
at the time a total invalid and was not informed as to any de
tail of this sale, nor as to any other matters concerning this
trust, or any matters whatsoever during the period mention
ed; and, in fact, was in no condition to consider business mat
ters. On the 17th of August 1921, by an order entered by the
Circuit Court of Bedford County, Virginia, Landon Lowry
was appointed subst'tuted trustee in the room and place of
said S. S. Lambeth, Jr. By reference to the order of appoint
ment, which is filed as exhibit D. with the bill of complaint in
said suit, it will appear that the ground upon which same
was entered was that the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee,
"had removed beyond the limits of this State," which order
was entered pursuant, as petitioner infers, to Section 6298
of the Code of 1919. It appears from the, bill of complaint
filed in said suit that the said Landon Lowry, substitute.]
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trustee, and the said J. H. Arrington declined to deliver the
tomatoes covered by the above mentioned contract, where
upon the complainants in said suit filed their bill to compel
(compliance by the said Lowry and Arrington with the teims
of the s£ud contract, in which suit your Honor decree in favor
of the complainants. Petitioner has noted in the pro-
[59] ceedings in this suit the allegation that the said John
L. Abbot was petitioner's authorized agent, and was in
fact in charge cf petitioner's office, and in charge of his un
finished busmess at the time of petitioner's illness. And
petitioner desires to confirm this allegation to the extent that
he did request Mr. Abbot to assist him in his practice, not so
much in a specific way with reference to this matter, though
petitioner recalls that there were some details connected with
the trust as to which Mr. Abbot's assistance was asked, as in
a general way, and that Mr. Abbot most efficiently and most
generously complied with petitioner's request in this regard.
But petitioner did not have in mind the sale of these toma
toes, nor in fact of any of the assets covered by the deed
of assignment at the time mentioned, so far as he now re
calls.
When the saM J. H. Arrington first consulted petitioner
as to his affairs, it was found that he was very much embar
rassed financially, having large obligations, and being unaWe
by reason of tlio prevail ng per.od of depression to realize
on his assets. The burden of his financial condition had so
weighed upon the mind of said Arrington, that petitioner can
state with absolute assurance that he had become mentally
incapacitated to transact business. He was suffering from a
very deep depression, so great that he had no power whatever
to realize his true financial condition, which was nothing like
as desperate as he himself thought, though complicated and
serious "by reason of his large obligations, and the depressed
condition of the market. When petitioner was first consulted
by the said Arrington, he, petit oner, declined to permit a
deed of assignment to be made, because he did not deem such
a step necessary, but upon reflection, and particularly in view
of Arrington's mental depression, and after consultation
with the said Arrington's wife, it was concluded that the best
method whereby the creditors might be protected, and the
estate at the same time conserved, would be to have a general
deed of assignment. By reference to this deed, however, it
will appear that there is a provision whereby the trustee was
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period of one year from the date of the deed.
Petitioner was aware of the difficulty of making a fair
liquidation of the said Arrington's property under the
[60] existing conditions, and it was his purpose, by insert
ing the; provision aforesaid, to prevent the creditors
from bringing about a sacrifice of the property if sold upon
a depressed market. It wiU also appear from said deed of
trust that very large, unusually large, discretionary powers,
are thereby vested in said trustee. Petitioner deems it pro
per tO'state at this point that the purchasers of said tomatoes
are. the controlling stockholdiers in the Bedford Can Company,
which is the largest creditor of the said J. H. Arrington, and
are also directors and large stockholders in the Peoples
National Bank, which, is the second largest creditor of the said
J. H. Arrington; the twp creditors mentioned representiag
approximately $12^000.00 of the indebtedness. While the sale
of these tomatoes was made about eight months subsequent to
the execution of the deed of assignment, unless the said Ar
rington had greatly improved in both physical and mental
condition, he was not possessed of the sound judgment which
was necessary to the adequate protection of his own interests,
but he was obsessed with the thought of his impoverishment,
to such an extent as to render h'm practically incompetent to
handle ordinary business affairs. Petitioner further deema
it proper to state that the purchasers of said tomatoes are all
reputable business men, and there is no evidence whatever
that they intentionally took any advantage of the said Arring
ton, but the relationship of debtor and creditor existed, and
the persons who were the purchasers of these tomatoes were
also most largely interested as creditors of the person from
whom they were purchasing. They were also by reason of
their identity with the canning business, or rather with the
manufacture of cans, in a position to be very accurately in
formed as to the market, present and prospective, of toma
toes. Petitioner may be permitted further to state that his
intervention in this pToceeding is very embarrassing to him,
and is justified only by what he conceives to be his duty to the
said J. H. Arrington, who was his client at the time of peti
tioner's illness, and whose mental stress, by reason of his
heavy losses, caused him to lean h^vily upon petition-
[61] er's judgiQ^ent, andi caused petitioner reciprocally to
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feel the obHgatioii incident to this responsibility. Peti^
tioner is not to be understood, however, as in the remotest de
gree criticizing the judgment or the conduct of Mr. John L.
Abbot, who represented the interest of his client with the ut
most fidelity, and with that high degree of intelligence which
he so well Imown to possess. But petitioner feels assured
that if his client has suffered by reason of the misinterpreta
tion of the law applicable to his case, or if petitioner himself,
as trustee, has been deprived of any powers or functions
which devolved upon him in such capacity, it is not only peti
tioner's right, but his duty, to present to the Court this his
petition for redress.
Petitioner will now proceed to a consideration of the
legal aspects of the decree entered in said suit, and of your
Honor's opinion supporting ,same, whereby the aforesaid
contract of sale is upheld to the pecuniary detriment of the
said Arrington of approximately $4500.00.
First: Before considering your Honor's opinion, peti
tioner asks leave to maintain his own status as trustee, and
to maintain his right to become a party to this suit by point
ing out that the order whereby he was removed from office,
was, as already indicated, entered by reason of the allega
tion that petitioner had removed beyond the I'mits of this
State. Petitioner is advised that the true meaning of this
language is that the trustee shall have removed his residence
to another state, not that a trustee shall surrender his rights
as such, or become disqualified, because he happens to be for
an indeterminate period a patient in a hospital located with
out the State of Virginia. It is a fact susceptible of proof
that the physicians at said hospital made written reports to
the effect that petitioner would be convalescent at or about
the very time that he was removed from office. Petitioner
had not removed from the State of Virginia. His residence
and his family, were both as formerly at Bedford, Virginia,
and he himself was only awaiting the return of his health
before taking up his duties as formerly. Hence, peti-
[62] tioner is advised that the order removing him upon the
grounds stated is void. Petitioner had no notice of
these proceedings for his removal.
And not only is said order void for the reasons stated,
but for the additional reason that the statute pursuant to
which said order was entered has no bearing upon a case
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where the deed of trust involved discretion, or personal confi
dence.
Eoller vs. Catlett, 118 Va., page 187.
Dillard vs. Dillard, 97 Va., page 442.
Petitioner therefore believes that being trustee in said
deed of assignment, he was a necessary party, not only to the
contract in question, but to the suit involving same, and that
he is entitled now to be made a party to same and to be heard
upon the merits of this case.
But petitioner also feels it proper to state to the Court
that the invoking of h^s rights as trustee is not done from a
personal standpoint, inasmuch, as he feels that it was desir
able that a trustee should have been appointed in view of his
then condition, and upon having his status recognized, and
upon having an opportunity to be heard in this suit, it is
petitioner's purpose to resign as such trustee so that the
aforesaid substituted trustee may continue in the execution of
the trust, having been first appointed to fill the vacancy
caused by petitioner's contemplated resignation.
Asking that th.s petition may be treated to the extent
necessary as a bill of review, petitioner proceeds as follows:
Second: The demurrer to the bill of complaint filed here
in, which demurrer was filed by Landon Lowry, trustee,
should have been sustained. It is not necessary to state the
various grounds of demurrer assigned, as reference may be
had to the demurrer itself for this purpose, and likewise
thereto for the authorities cited in support of such grounds.
Petitioner may summarize by saying.
(a) That equity gives no jurisdiction for specific per
formance of a contract for the sale of goods and chattels
where the chattels have no pretinum affectionis. The remedy
is complete at law.
In th's case, the cr'g'nal action was !n detinue. This ac
tion could not be maintained for the reason that the
[63] plaintiffs had no title to the specific goods. Petitioner
is aware that your Honor in his opinion holds that title
to the tomatoes did pass upon the execution of the contract.
Petitioner submits however, that your Honor is in error as
to this, for the contract itself provides '' Title to pass on de
livery and acceptance". The Court does not refer to this
clause of the contract, and it evidently escaped the Court's at-
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tention. When the parties themselves- (even, for the moment
assuming the validity of the contract) provided when the
title shall pass, this is final as between the parties. The con
tract further gave to the purchasers the right to inspect on
delivery and refuse unmerchantable goods. Inspection was,
therefore,, a condition precedent to the passing of title, and
until the goods had been delivered and inspected, it would be
impossible to say which of the goods would be accepted. But,
aside from this, the specific provision of the contract, above
quoted, as to the t^me when title should pas$ must prevail.
In the opinion of petitioner, the case presents a simple con
tract for the sale of personal property wMch could have been
purchased in any quantity desired on the open market at ix
defimte price, and the well established, and petitioner thinks,
exclusive remedy, was an action for damages for non-deliv
ery. Equity does not take cogTiizance of a case of this sort,
the remedy at Jaw being adequate and complete. If the goods
sold had possessed any special or peculiar value, or had been
the subject of pretium affectionis, the rule would be other
wise, and equity would decree specific execution of the con
tract, but no sueh contention is made in this case.
The authorities cited by Mr. Lowry in his demurrer am
ply sustain h's contention that the remedy at law was ade
quate and complete.
Third; The sa^e by Mr. Abbot as agent for petitioner,
then trustee was in petitioner's opinion ultra vires and void,
falling within the rule expressed in the maxim delegatus non
potest delegare. Petitioner's impression of the law is that a
trustee cannot delegate his powers, nor can he empower an
agent to execute trusts confided in him. The powers
[64] conferred upon a trustee call for the exercise of per
sonal discretion, and such powers having been reposed
in a definite person, cannot be exercised by another.
Petitioner discusses this phase of the case with some em
barrassment because when he bccame incapacitated to trans
act business because of illness, he undoubtedly requested Mr.
Abbot to look after the business of petitioner's office. He
did this in a very efficient and generous way, and as to any
matter which petitioner had authority to commii to him, peti
tioner would certainly approve his (Mr. Abbot's) acts, even
though at a loss to petitioner; but the point is that petitioner
himself had no pcrwer to confer authority upon him to make
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this sale; and, viewed from a legal standpoint, his acts were
void. Petitioner has no criticism whatever of Mr. Abbot's
judgment in making the sale at the price named in the con
tract, for he, no doubt, under the conditions confronting him,
acted prudently, and in the interest of Mr. Arrington as he
believed. Petitioner is merely discussing his legal authority
to act for the trustee.
But the learned Court seems to rest the decision of the
case, not so much on Mr. Abbot's contract, as on Mr. Arring
ton's acquiescence therein, as evidenced by his. signature to
the contract of sale. This brings up the question whether
Arrington himself had the right to make the sale. If Mr. Ab
bot had no legal authority to act for the trustee, then his sig
nature to the contract as agent for the trustee could impart
no dignity or legal sanction to Arrington's signature. Con
versely, neither could Arrington's signature to the contract
impart validity to Abbot's. If there is legal liability by rea
son of this contract it must rest in Arring-ton's signature
alone, it must arise because Arrington had a property inter
est in the tomatoes which made them the proper subject of a
sale by him
And, if this reasoning be sound, it also follows that a
creditor after mak-ng a deed of ass'gnment, can continue to
sell, from time to time, any part of the trust subject assigned,
and convey a good title to the property so sold by h"m. Such
a conclusion can scarcely be justified. If a creditor, after
conveying to a trustee title to his property, may continue to
dispose of it, or a part of it, or contract with reference
,[65] to it, then the assignment is nugatory and meaningless,
and is a trap or a trick whereby the creditor may, es
cape his debtors rather than protect them.
Again, the r'ght to sell property, real or personal, is based
upon ownership of the property, and carries with it the right
to collect the purchase money. We have seen that under the
authorities a trustee cannot delegate his duties under the
trust deed, hence Mr. Abbot could not make this sale as agent
for the trustee. If he could not make the sale as agent, he
could not collect the purchase money. If Arrington could
make the sale, then Arrington could collect the purchase
money. If he could collect the purchase money for one part
of the property, title to which was in the trustee, then he
coi^d coEect the purchase money for another part of the trust
subject. It follows, therefore, ^at under the learned Court's
TO
mling, a creditor havingmade a conveyance of all his proper
ty to a trustee for the benefit of his creditors, may proceed
subsequently in the teeth of his trust deed to make sales of
the same property from time to time, collect the purchase
money and pocket the same, whilehis creditors stand helpless
ly by and watch the performance. In other words, with the
aid of a deed of assignment, he could first put his property
into such shape that his creditors could not reach it, and then
proceed to convert the same property into liquid assets and
put such assets out of reach of his creditors.
Therefore, when a Court of Chancery sanctions such a
proposition, the Court is inadvertently giving judicial ap
proval in equity to an act which would be the ground for at
tachment proceedings at law.
But his Honor argues that Arrington was solvent, that
his farm was worth more than the amount of his debts, that
his creditors could have recourse to his land for the sa,tis-
faction of their debts, and that these tomatoes were, in effect,
a part of the surplus of his property over and above his liabil
ities, from which facts the learned Court concludes that Ar
rington had a right to authorize the sale, and is bound there
by. Ill support of this conclusion your Honor .cites a case
which is referred to as being directly in point, namely, the
case of Hammond vs. B'dley, 116 Va. 393.
A careful reading of the facts of this case d'fferentiate
it from the case at bar, and the Court's opinion applies to the
facts totally dissimilar principles of law.
In the first place, in Hammond vs. Eidley, the grantor
in the deed of assigiunent expressly reserves his home-
[66] stead exemption, and the trustees ascertained that the
value of the homestead exemption completely absorbed
the value of the grantor's one-half interest in the land which
passed under the deed of assignment, so that all that passed
to the trustees was the naked legal title. All that there was
of value in the land remained in the grantor by the express
terms of the deed of assignment. The Court does hold,'how
ever, in the case of Hammond vs. Eidley, that
"A deed of conveyance to secure creditors does not,
as contended divest the grantor of aU interest in the pro
perty conveyed. His beneficial interest continues, sub
ject to be applied to the satisfaction of the debts secured.
The grantor can further encumber the interest as was
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done in this case, by the mortgage to secure Ridley, the
$206.36."
This is all true in accordance with established principles
of law, but these principles of law have no application to the
case now before the Court. In every deed of assignment the
grantor is entitled to the surplus remaining after the satisfac
tion of the creditors, and this equity is property which may be
conveyed or encumbered. But this is vastly different from a
right of sale or conveyance by the grantor of a part of the
specific property assigned to the trustee, the title whereto is
vested in the trustee by virtue of the assigfnment. The trustee
must sell or convey the property assigned to him, aild the
trustee alone has authority to do this. The grantor may sell,
assign or convey his interest :n the trust subject, which inter
est is what remains in the hands of the trustee after the cred
itors have been paid. But in the case at bar, Arrington did
not sell his equity in the trust subject. He undertook to sell,
according to his Honor's view, a part of the specific property
which he had conveyed to the trustee, title to which was :n the
trustee, and in him alone. Arrington had no more to do
with the tomatoes than the Sheriff of Bedford County had.
His sole interest was in the surplus remaining in the trustee's
hands (an intangible claim not susceptible of a legal title)
after the trust had boen executed. Hence when Arr'ngton
assumed to sell what was not his, he was a mere intruder and
his act was void.
More than that, he would, in fact, though not intention
ally, by the very language of Section 4455 of the Code
[67] of 1919, have been guilty of larceny, if after such sale
he had declined to deliver the tomatoes to the trustee.
The section last quoted shows how completely in contempla
tion of law the grantor, even though retaining possession, is
divested of the title and the jus d'sponendi as. to property
passirg under a deed of ass giiment. He is merely the custo
dian for the trustee. His right to the surplus after payment
of the debts is a distinct right resting upon other principles,
and not in contravention "of the trust deed; hence when the
Court sustains the right of an assignor to sell or encumber his
equity in the trust subject, it does not, by any means follow
that such grantor may sell the trust subject itself or any part
thereof. The trustee alone may sell that. Hence the case of
Hammond vs. Ridley, we respectfully submit, is not at all in
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point.
Summarizing his argument upon this important phase of
the case, petitioner says, first, that no title and no property
iiiterest in the tomatoes could pass to the purchaser under the
alleged sale because there was no delivery, and the contract
itself provides specifically title to pass on inspection and
delivery."
Second, that John L. Abbot could not sell as agent for
the trustee (who was at the time out of the State of Virginia
and had no knowledge whatever of the transaction) because
the trustee himself by an express writing had no legal power
to authorize Mr. Abbot to execute a discretionary trust re
posed by the terms of the deed upon the trustee and upon no
other person. And, third, that Arrington, the person who
by his deed of assignment, had divested h mself of all title to
sJl of the property described in the trust deed could there
fore make no valid contract or sale as to any part thereof.
His lack of authority to do th s lies on the surface. If a gran
tor in a deed of assignment can continue to deal with the sub
ject assigned or with any part thereof, either as owner or
(^uasi owner, or in aiiy other proprietary way, what becomes
of the provisions of the trust deed? "What does the
[68] trust deed amount tol How couM the public know with
whom to deal and from whom to purchase? The gran
tor, more often than otherwise insolvent, could sell to one
person, the trustee to another, and neither purchaser would
know who Was getting title. Such an assumption by an as
signor is alike repugnant to the very essence of the transac
tion and utterly destructive of the sanctity and finality of his
deliberate deed of assignment.
The principles thus contended for are, we submit with
deference, decisive of the case. But we ask leave to advert
briefly to one or two other propositions laid down by the
learned Circuit Court in his written opmion.
In substance, the opinion of the learned Court justifies the
exercise of chancery jurisdiction in this case, both because a
trust is involved and because a discovery or disclosure of
Arrington's assets is necessary in order to ascertain whether
he was solvent, the question of his solvency, in the learned
Courtis view, being the determining factor as to his right to
sell the tomatoes.
Our view, as we have endeavored to present it, is not
,iv>hether A-rrington was'Solvent, but whether he has .conveyed
the title and entice;administration of the property in questioii
to a trustee with such broad powers of discretion and Sale in
such.trustee as tO: exclude any'and every right of contract or
sale"-by Arrington, leaving in him only the right to the sur
plus after payment of debts. If -we have successfully main
tained this proposition, then the question of Arrington-s. sol
vency is unimportant. If he had no title, he could convey
none, solvent or insolvent. If the trustee was, by the unusual
ly comprehensive terms of the deed of assignment, invested
not only with title but with broad discretion as to the time
and terms of sale, and in absolute control of the property this
necessarily excluded Arrington and made him a stranger <t,o
the whole matter. And his assumption of the power to sell
was a nullity.
Add if it be further true that Mr. Abbot could not exer
cise the power of sale conferred upon the trustee, and there
would seem to be no question as to this under the
[69] authorities, then the whole contract set up in the bill
of complaint is a nullity, and we with deference submit
that the bill should be dismissed for want of equity, or the de
murrer thereto should be sustained.
If there is any liabilitj'^ on Arrington, it is for failing to
deliver goods contracted to be soM, and, Arrington being
found solvent in the opinion of the learned Court," the remedy
against him is by action for damages. But as a matter of
'fact, Atrington made no sale. He approved a contract of sale
by the agent of the trustee, a contract which never had legal
validity, arid to which neither party could impart validity, fot
"where one confers authority which he "himself does npt
possess, he confers nothing. Hence the whole transaction
was void, ab initio, and as the purchasers were charged with
the legal effect of the deed of assignment, duly of record, they
acted at their own hazard and a priiieipal analogous to caveat
omptor would apply.
And the same result is reached when we consider the
additional ground of equity jurisdiction invoked by the learn
ed Court, namely, the necessity of a disclosure or discovery
as to Arrington*s assets. No: matter what assets Arrington
might be found to possess, no matter whether the discovery
showed him to be solvent or insolvent, the fact could not affect
the administration of this trust by the trustee named in the
deed and by none othier, and could not impart to Arrington
74
powers of which he had emptied himself by the solemn
deliberate act of executing the deed of assignment. Hence the
futility of entertaining the bill as a bill for discovery.
But aside from this, the right of a Court of equity to take
cognizance of a case and to decide the merits merely because
discovery is asked, or is necessary, is negatived by the very
nature of the bill of discovery, which is a proceeding in equity
whereby inaccessible facts are made accessible for use in an
action at law. It is not an independent, but an ancillary part
of equity jurisdiction.
In fact, the bill for discovery appears to have been super
seded in Virginia by the liberal statute permitting interroga
tories.
"It seems that in Virginia, bills of discovery are
now entirely superseded in practice by two statutory pro
visions, one allowing a Court of law to compel a discovery
: upon oath, in answer to interrogatories filed, wherever it
would be compelled upon a bill for discovery, if the in
terrogatories have not been ,unreasonably delayed (Va.
Code Ch. 164, Sections 3370-3372); and the other, declar
ing parties to suits, with some important qualifications,
to be competent to give evidence on their own behalf, and
to be competent and compellable to attend and give evi
dence on behalf of any other party to the proceeding (Va.
Code 1887, Ch. 164, Sections 3343-3351)" 4 Min. Inst.
3rd Ed. 1375; 1 Barton's Ch. Pr..(2iid Ed) Section 323.
Of course, if there is independent ground of equity juris
diction after discovery is had, the Court. wiU give gen-
[70] eral relief. But in this case we conceive that there is
no such independent ground.
The claim asserted by C. W. Gills and his associates is
merely an unliquidated money demand for a breach of con
tract of sale, and this demand is the subject of cordon law
jurisdiction and not equity.
In addition, there would seem to be no necessity for dis
covery as the assets of J. H. Arrington could be readily dis
covered out of the mouths of one or two witnesses whose testi
mony is available, and in fact, these assets are known to all
parties concerned in this controversy to consist simply of
Arrington's farm, his canned goods, and his' personal and
chattel property, stock, etc., on the farm.
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Therefore, if the claim asserted were reduced to judg-
menty it would only be necessary to levy an execution upon
the personal property, or to have foreclosure proceedings
upon such judgment.
Wherefore, your petitioner being without remedy other
than in the Court of Chancery in this proceeding, and for the
reason herein set forth, prays that the following named per
sons may be made parties defendant to this petition and re
quired to answer the same, but not under oath, to-wit: C. W.
Gills, G. M. Wiginton, George "W. Johnson, J. T. Davidson,
J. H. Arrington, and Landon Lowry, trustee; that he may be
admitted as a party defendant to the original bUl filed in the
aforesaid suit; that his status as trustee under the aforesaid
deed from J. H. Arrington and wife may be established; that
your Honor may set aside and annul the decree entered in
said suit on July 19th, 1922; that the aforesaid contract cover
ing the alleged sale of the tomatoes assigned to said trustee
by the said J. H. Arrington may be declared null, void and
of no effect; and that petitioner may have all such
[71] other, further and general relief as the nature of this
case may render necessary.
And petitioner will ever pray, etc.
Anewsr of Landon Lowry, Trustee
The answer of Landon Lowry, trustee, to the petition of
S. S. Lambeth, Jr., filed in the above entitled cause.
For answer to said petition, respondent states that it is
true that he was appointed trustee under the deed of assign
ment from J. Howard Arrington, in the place and stead
[72] of the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr., as set forth in said peti-
. tion, and that he has acted as such since the date of his
appointment. At the t'me of his appointment, the said S. S.
Lambeth, Jr., was incapacitated by reason of a protracted ill
ness, and was outside the limits of the State of Virginia. Re
spondent, however, does not desire to assume an argumenta
tive or combative attitude as to the validity of his own ap
pointment, for the reason that upon the return of the said S.
"S. Lambeth, Jr., to Bedford, restored in health, respondent
offered to resign as such trustee and to turn over the said
trust to the said S. S. Lambeth, Jr.
But respondent does^ respectfully- join in the prayer of
. 'said petition for a re-hearing of the Court's decree entered in
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this cause, and for a' reversal of-the same upon the-grounds
S6t forth in respondent's original-pleadings,-supplemented
'by the reasons advanced in the petition of said S. S. Lanibeth,
Jr., all of the allegations of said petition'relating to t^he de
cree referred to, respondent hereby adopts as if fully-'sel/forth
heerin. And now having 'fully answered, respondent prays
to'be'hence dismissed, etc.
Answer of J. Howard Arrington
The answer of J. Howard Arrington to a, petition of S.
S. Lambeth, Jr., filed in the above styled cause.
. For answer to said petition, said respondent is advised
that it is not necessary for him to answer at length. He asks
for a re-hearing as prayed for in the said petition, and adopts
the allegations thereof as to the reasons for such re-hearing,
as fully as if the same were set forth herein. And now
having answered as far as respondent is advised it is neces
sary that he should answer, he prays hence to be dismissed,
etc.
[73] Demurrer and Answer of C. W. Gills, Etc.
The demurrer and answer of C. W. Gills, G. M. Wiging-
ton, George W. Johnson, and J. T. Davidson to a petition of
S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, filed in the suit of C. W. Gills, 6t
als V. Landon Lowry, trustee, et als., in the Circuit Court of
Bedford County.
Your respondents demur to said petition and say that
the same is not sufficient in law, and without waiving their
said deniurrer, and expressly relying thereon, they proceed to
answer the said petition as follows:
First: Your respondents adm t the execution of the deed
of assignment from J. Howard Arrington to S. S. Lambeth,
Jr., trustee on Nov. 9, 1920, the subsequent nervous break
down on the part of the said Lambeth, trustee and the em
ployment by him of John L. Abbot, who attended to the aif-
fairs of his office, all of ^hich is set forth in the original bill
of complaint in this suit. The execution of the contract 6f
sale by the said John L. Abbot, agent for said Latnbeth, trus
tee, with the approva! and consent of the said J. H. Arring-
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toga, is likewise set forth in said bill of complaint.
Second; Your respondents are advised that they are not
concerned with the legality of the proceedings whereby the
said S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, was removed and Landon
Lowry was substituted in his place, as the order of Conrt so
removing said trustee was not entered until a month after the
date of the contract of, sale under which respondents pur
chased the canned tomatoes involved in this suit.
Third:. Respondents deny that the said J. H. Arrington
was ever mentally incapacitated to transact his business;
on the contrary, respondents allege that he was keenly alive to
every interest, and especially was he interested in the sale of
these tomatoes and exercised and displayed good business
judgment in co-operating with said Abbot as agent for the
trustee in making said sale.
Fourth: Respondents deny the implied imputation in
said petition that any pressure was brought to bear upon the
said Arrington by the Bedford Can Co., a corporation in
"which respondents are large stockholders, as one of the credi
tors of the said J. H. Arrington, or the Peoples Nation-
[74] al Bank, of which some of the respondents are direc
tors. On the contrary, respondents would call the
Court's attention to the fact that the Bedford Can Co., and
the Peoples National Bank, who were the largest creditors of
the said J. H. Arrington, consented to the acting trustee of
said Arrington to pay all of the other debts in full. The Can
Co., subsequently consented that the trustee might pay the
Peoples Bank in full, and respondents are now advised and
believe that all of the other creditors of the said J. H. Arring
ton except the Bedford Can Co., have been paid in full, and
respondents claim that the sale of these tomatoes was made
by the said J. H. Arrington co-operating with Mr. Abbot, as
agent for the trustee, because in their judgment they thought
it was an advantageous sale, and respondent would further
call the Court's attention to the fact that the authority of Mr.
Abbot as agent for the said Lambeth,' trustee, was not only
recognized by Mr. Arrington, the debtor, but by all of his
creditors, who dealt with him and received dividends from
him, and who knew he was acting for the said Lambeth, and
his authqrity or right to make sale of the property of J. H.
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Arrington was not even questioned until some time after the
sale of these tomatoes was made to your respondents, and
would not then have been questioned if the price of tomatoes
had not advanced after said sale, as it appears from the evi
dence in this case that after the said contract of sale had been
signed, the said Arrington- employed onie R. 0. Lee to haul
the said tomatoes to Bedford, thereby showing that he rec
ognized that the said contract was binding upon him at that
time.
Fifth': ifeeplylng to the legal aspects of this case as set
forth in the latter part of the said petition, respondents do
not deem it necessary to go into any further discussion of the
legal questions involved in this case, as they have all been
argued, considered by the Court and decided. A careful read
ing of the petition discloses no new questions which were not
considered and decided by the Court in its very able opinion
heretofore delivered in this case. Respondents still claim, as
i^hey have always contended in this suit, that under the terms
of the general deed of assignment made by J. H. Ar-
[75] rington to S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, the said trustee
had full authority to employ agents or assistants, and
it is admitted *n the petition of Mr. Lambeth and testified to
by Mr. Abbot, who was a w'tness in this case, that the affairs
of Mr. L^beth's office, mcluding the management of the
Arrington trust, were fully turned over to Mr. Abbot, and re
spondents therefore ^laim that he, as agent for Mr. Lambeth,
trustee, had a right to make sale of said tomatoes, but as de
cided by this Honorable Court, if there should have been any
doubt about Mr. Abbot's right to make the sale simply as
agent for Mr. Lambeth, there could certainly have been no
quiBstion about Mr. Arrington, who was the real owner of
these toinatoes, having the right to sell same. This doctrine
has been recognized by the Court of Appeals since the case of
Hale V. Home, reported in 21 Gratt., page 112, and a number
of cases decided since that t'm'^, including the case of Ham
mond V. Ridley's Executor et als., reported in 116 Va. page
393, quoted in your Honor's opinion heretofore filed in this
suit, and by a decree made a part of this record.
Your respondents further claim that the former decree
entered in this suit, which decided that the said Arrington
had a right to sell all of his interest in said tomatoes, and
that an account should be taken in this suit, requiring the
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trustee for Arrington to settle his accounts, thereby disclos
ing, as your respondents believe it will, that the said Arring
ton is solvent and has more than enough money to pay his
debts, was clearly right, .and this decree should now be exe^
cuted. And. now having fully answered, your respondents
pray to be hence dismissed, with their reasonable costs &c.
OPINION OF THE COURT
This is a petition filed by S. S. Lambeth, Jr., asking a re
view of the decree entered by this Court in this cause at the
July Term 1922. The petition urges, among other things, the
fact of Howard Arrington and wife executing the deed of-
trust on the 9th of November 1920, and that shortly after exe
cuting the said deed, the trustee suffered a nervous break
down, by reason whereof he left the County of Bedford
[76] and was gone for an indefiite period, but never was a
non-resident of the State of Virginia.
That by contract dated July 17th, 1921, signed by C. W.
Gills, John L. Abbot agent for S. S. Lambeth, Jr., and J.
Howard Arrington, all of the marketable tomatoes in said
Arrington's factories were sold to said Grills at prices set.
forth in the peftion, and at a time when the trustee was not
informed and was a total invalid, and in no condition to do
business. That on the 17th of August, 1921, an order was en
tered by this Court, appointing Landon Lowy, substituted
trustee, in said deed, in the room and place of S. S. Lambeth,
"Jr., trustee, the grounds of which were that the said Lambeth
had moved beyond the limits of this-State, said order being in
pursuance of Section 6298 of the^ Code of Virginia of 1919.
That from the bill of complaint, it appears that the said
Lowry, substituted trustee, and the' said Arrington declined
to deliver the tomatoes covered by the above mentioned con
tract, whereupon the comp%inants filed, their bill to conri'Hil
compliance by said Lowry and Arrington with the terms of
the said contract.
Further petitioner says that there is an allegation that
John L. Abbot was his authorized agent during his absence,
and was in fact in charge of his office, and of his business.
That while he desires to confirm this allegation, that he did
request Mr. Abbot to assist him in hiis practice, not so much
in a specific way with reference to this matter, though there
•were some details in connection therewith. That the peti-
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tioner did not have in mind the sale of these tomatoes, or any
of the assets covered by the deed of trust, so far as "he now
recalls. That when Arrington first consulted petitioner, he
founcf that he, Arrington, was very much involved financially,
having large obligations and unable, by reason of the prevail
ing period of depreciation, to realize on his assets. That the
burden of his condition had so weighed upon the mind of said
Arrington, that petitioner can state with absolute assurance
that he had beer me mentally incompetent to transact business,
though about that time he wrote and prepared this deed
[77] of trust, by which the said Arrington conveyed thou
sands of dollars worth of property to him, to secure
the very large indebtedness.
Petitioner states many other matters, not deemed neces
sary here to repeat, but the same appears to be to have the
Court declare an order appointing a substituted trustee void,
and reinstate the said Lambeth as such, upon the ground that
he was not a non-resident, and had no notice that said motion
was going to be made, and upon the further grounds that even
If he had notice, it was a discretioiiary trust in him, and that
the statute does not app^y to the same. Petit'oner then goes
on and asks that he be admitted a party to the suit, and that
same be filed as a cross bill herein, and renews all of his rea
sons and allegations made upon the arguing of this case be
fore, why the Court shouM not overrule the demurrer to al
low the same to proceed to a fi^iial determination.
No new points of law are raised at all. There is no after
discovered evidence relied upon, and it seems to the Court
that if there were a final decree entered, as above said, in tliis
Court, there should have been an appeal from the same, and
not a bill of review making alone the same points for rehear
ing that were heard when said case was determined.
Mr. Lambeth was not a party to the original suit, and
really no one but a party to the original istiit can file a bill of
review, and it must be to a final decree. A petition might be
filed, however, for a rehearing of said decreej but even that,
it seems to me, should state some other cause or reason than
those that the Court has already passed upon, but be that as
it may, the record on the motion to substitute the trustee
shows no error. It alleges that S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee,
was a non-resident of the State of Virginia, and the Court so
decided, as shown by the order appointing said substituted
trustee. Whether he was or not the record does not show
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any error in this respect, and the fact as detailed by him that
he was not a non-resident was just as well disclosed at sthe
time of the decree as it is now, so it is not in the nature of
after discovered evidence, but be that as it may, even if Mr.
Lambeth was not a non-resident, and I have full faith in what
he says, then the prayer of the petition is granted to
[78] make him a party defendant to this suit, and he will
be allowed to file his answfer, or make any other de
fense that he sees proper to the same, but his interest has been
in no way affected by what has already been done in the suit.
The substituted trustee Lowry, is required to come here
into this suit, settle his account as trustee, and the Court will
have the trust administered under its direction: If there is
any controversy however, between the substituted trustee and
the original trustee as to the commission, which is the only
way in which the original trustee can be financially interested,
the Court can certainly pass upon that as between the two
trustees.
As to the second point, that the trust is a discretionary
one in Lambeth, and no substituted trustee could be appoint
ed, this Court can't accede to the view presented by the peti
tion. The case of Dillard vs. Dillard, 97 Va. page 434, is re
ferred to as authority for the position taken here. That cas^
is clearly one not under the purview of the statute. It is one
in which the discretionary part of the trust became extinct
with the death of the trustee, and never could be executed at
all afterwards. Mrs. Dillard by the 5th clause of her will,
gave her two sons, William S. Dillard, Stephen T. and her
son-in-law, John C Mundy, in trust, all her right, title and in
terest in and to a tract of land on which her son John T. Dil
lard resided, to be held and managed by said trustees at their
own absolute discretion. They may permit said John T Dil
lard to enjoy &nd occupy this land, or to pay him the whole
or anv part of the princ'pal ov interest of the $2500.00 given
him above, but shall not be compelled, or liable to be compelled
to do so either in law or equity. It seems that one of the trus
tees died before the discretionary part of the will was carried
out and John T. Dillard brought suit to enforce his claim, but
the Court held that it was a joint discretion in the three trus
tees, and one of them having died without the discretion be
ing exercised,, that the other two could not exepute. The
deed of trust became eixtinct and John T. Dillard lost his in
terest under his mother's will, it being a discretionary trust,
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and peculiarly one of personal confidence, and one
[79] Which absolutely failed or became extinct by the death
of one of the trustees. It absolutely cannot be contend
ed here that if Mr. Lambeth had died that this deed of trust
would have become extinct, because while he has very broad
and comprehensive powers given him by the deed of trust,
the land was directed to be sold, the debts paid and any bal
ance turned over, to the said Howard Arrington, his executors
or assigns, so it can't be that there was no power to appoint
a substituted trustee in this cause, if Mr. Lambeth had been
a non-resident.
Furthermore, his interest in it is only a financial one. He
holds a naked, legal title for the benefit of the creditors, and
at the instance of the grantors ,and certainly he can get his
commissions yet, if he is entitled to the same. Lowry was ap
pointed substituted trustee on the motion of Howard Arring
ton, he making the motion, and with the consent of all the
creditors named in the deed, nobody made any objection, and
so far as he has gone, his action has been ratified by the credi
tors arid by Arrington, save in this particular instance, and if
nothing more, there will be an estoppal against Arrington to
say that the act is absolutely void, and all the proceedings of
this suit in consequence thereof nugatory, and after making
Jkfr. Lambeth a defendant, which will be readily done by a
decree, he can file his answer, or make any other defense per
sonal to himself wh^ch be deems proper, but the Court does
not agree with the allegations of the petition that it will have
a right to entertain any of the reasons given by the said Lam
beth for the reversal of this decree heretofore made, which
apply and relate to Arrington's contract made by himself,
with Mr. Abbot as his adviser, mth the plaintiff's in this
cause.
The allegation that Arrlng-ton had no capacity, and d'dn't
know what he was doing when he executed this contract, is
absolutely and completely refuted, not only by Mr. Abbot in
his testimony, but by the conduct of Arrington himself. Ar
rington answers the bill, he demurs to the bill, relies upon his
demurrer and says that the Court has no jurisdiction of the
case,'first, because he should have brought a suit at
[80] law; second, because he had no authority to execute the
contract, it being a sale of property embraced with a
trust, and that the trustee alone cbuld sell the same. No men
tion is made anywhere that Arrington didn't have sufficient
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capacity to take care of himself. In fact the contrary plainly
appears throughout the whole proceeding. The fact that he
made a deed of trust, and that he was a man of affairs, and
owing many debts, refutes the idea, and his prudence in as
sociating with him in all his transactions a man of the highest
character and high order of intelligence, like John Abbot, be
fore he took any steps in the case whatever. None of these
reasons, therefore, would be sufficient to allow a bill of re
view for after discovered evidence.
The petitioner then takes up the case and discusses it ex
actly as was done before, raising no other points than those
raised when the case was tried. It is claimed that equity
gives no jurisdiction for specific performance of a contract
for the sale of goods and chattels, where the chattels have no
pretium affectionis, the remedy being complete at law. This
is certainly true as an abstract proposition, and as hereto
fore decided, while it was an entry of an appeal for specific
performance, it was for a d'scovery, the specific perform^ce
being only an ancillary relief. There are many cases in which
equity and law both have concurrent jurisdiction, and where
it is more complete in equity, a party may go into equity
even though he may have a remedy at law, and he w^H be en
tertained and relief granted to the full extent, because equity
does not do justice by piecemeal.
In this case the orig'nal action was in detinue, and the
petition said it could not be maintained, and it certainly is
agreeing to what the Court decided, though the Court came to
its conclusion from much different reasons than those of the
petitioner. He say that the title of the tomatoes did not pass
upon the execution of the contract. That is true. The title to
pass on delivery and acceptance, and that the remedy, if he
had any at all, he says here by suit for damages, the plaintiffs
to go in open market, buy the tomatoes for such prices
[81] as they could got them for and charge the difference to
Arrington, with any loss they m'ght sustain in conse
quence thereof.
In the first place, while it is not admitted that possession
is always necessary to maintain an action of detinue," still if
it were, the possession was in the trustee and Arrington, and
they refused flatly to deliver possession, so title might pass
upon delivery and acceptance. They refused to allow inspec
tion of the tomatoes, and it would certainly be allowing them
to take advantage of their own wrong to say that they could
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refuse to allow what was necessary to be done before the"
party could claim the title. The right of inspection was given
these parties, but they couldn't inspect, because they couldn't
get possession. The reason of the Court was that the trustee
denied that Arrington had a right to sell at aD, that it naight
be to the prejudice of the creditors, that it might require the
sale of these tomatoes to pay off the debts, and that question
could not be determined in a Court at law at all. A Court
had no power over a trustee in a Court of law to make him
settle his accounts, and pass upon the same, consequently, the
Court held that the action of detinue did not lie; that the pro
perty sold by Arrington and Abbot to the plaintiffs was em
braced within a trust, and that the trustee was entirely an
tagonistic to the rights of the plaintiffs, refused to recog
nize themi in any. way, and that they had a right to come into
a Court of equity and ask the Court, according to the terms of
the deed, to place them in the position that Arrington would
be as to the equity of redemption in the property.
They say that equity has yet got jurisdiction, because
they have got a remedy at law, as above stated, by going into
the market and buying the tomatoes, etc. This is wholly illog
ical and can't be worked out to any intelligent conclusion.
Here these part'es wore; they had a contract unquestionably
with Arrington and Abbot, they must have a remedy where
there is a right. Certainly they had a right to contest the
thing, and see whether the^r contract was enforceable or not,
but they,cannot go into the open market and buy the tomatoes.
"Who ever heard of buying an equity of redemption? It
is true they had a given number of cases, 750Q, the title
[82] to pass upon possession and acceptance, and they were
to be inspected. Now if upon inspection it turned out
that some of them were not accepted, they couldn't have
known how many to buy, they couldn't have bought, because
if they had come back here and brought their suit, why the
answer would have been right straight, you have never had
possession, you merely bought the equity of redemption, you
don't know what it was, and for want of certainty and defi-
niteness you can't maintain your action at law, you cannot in
spect because we wouldn't let you, we refused you possession,
we deny you had any rights at all, and you would be abso
lutely without remedy, either in law or equity.
It is useless for me to refer to the authorities again to
show that equity has jurisdiction over trust matters, and if
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the-trustees so chose, when questions of this sort arise not to
bring a suit, why any party in interest has a right to do so.
In a deed of trust to secure creditors, the trustee is the agent
of both partiesii debtor and creditor, and should act impar
tially between them, and in making" sale of the trust subject,
he should use all reasonable diligence to obtain the best price,
and if there is any cloud hanging over the title, or uncertainty
as to the amount of debts secured, or of prior encumbrances
or any other impediment, in the fair execution of the trust,
the aid of a Court of equity should be invoked by him to re
move the impediments, and if he fails or refuses to resort to
the Court for that purpose, any party in interest, whether he
be debtor secured, creditor or subsequent encumbrances, may
apply to the Court for relief. Shurtz vs. Johnson, 28 Grat.
675; Eossett vs. Fisher 11 Grat. 492; Hogan vs. Duke 20 Grat;
Horton vs. Bond 28 Grat. 815, and many authorities.
The trustee in this case was agent for the creditors and
agent for Arrington. When Arringtoh sold his tomatoes to
the plaintiffs, then the trustee, pursuant to the terms of the
deed itself, would be required to pay the money or turn the
toniatoes over to them, instead of Arrington, and they have a
right to come into Court of equity and demand it. They have
a further right to require the trustee under the terms of their
contract with Arrington, they having bought this pro^
[83] perty, to sell the other property embraced in the deed
in exoneration of this, in order that it may be left for
them as a result of their contract, but in this instance it is
perfectly manifest that these plaintiffs could not have re
quired this relief save by going into a Court of equity and
demand'ng that the trustee execute the trust, under the order
of the Court, and not as the attorney and legal adviser of Ar
rington, who repudiates the contract for legal reasons, not
deemed sufficient by the Court bue deemed sufficient by the
trustee.
The petitioner then says that Mr. Abbot was ultra vires
and void, and falling within the rule expressed in the maxim
"Delegatus non Potest Delegare." He says a trustee cannot
delegate his powers, nor can he empower an agent to execute
a trust confided in him. That's very true, unless the deed it
self gives binn the right to do so, and this deed here does plain
ly,give him that right. It is simply referred to to sustain this
assertion. Power is given the trustee, Mr. Lambeth, to sell
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any of the property, and to appoint agents to assist him in
nianaging the affairs, and to sell any of the property he sees
proper, upon such terms and at such price as he deems best,
and while he denies having given Mr. Abbot power, Mr. Ar-
ring^on and the creditors gave it to him in the absence of Mr.
Lambeth. Arrington recognized his right to act as trustee
instead of Lambeth, and the creditors so recognized it. He
sold the property, paid debts, took receipts and was manag
ing matters just as Lambeth would have managed them, had
he been here, all with the knowledge, approval, concurrence
and consent of Arrington and the creditors, and without say
ing that this very comprehensive power given Lambeth g^ve
hi-m the right to authorize Abbot to act. Abbot certainly
thought he had a right to act and acted in goodfaith, and Ar
rington treated him as acting in good faith, and it is another
reason why these people have a right to come here in this
Court of equity and assert their rights. He says Arrington
had no legal authority to act for the trustee. That is granted,
but non constat, he had the right to act for himself, he was
the grantor, tho beneficial interest left after the payment of
all the debts was in him,^ and petitioner repudiated the
[84] law as la!d down by the Supreme Court in the case re
ferred to in the or'ginal opinion of Hammond vs. Rid
ley 116 Va., page 393, in which it is plainly said,v"the deed
of conveyance to secure creditors does not, as intended, divest
the grantor of all interest in the property conveyed, Ms bene
ficial interest remain subject to be applied to the satisfaction
of the debt secured. The grantor can further encumber his
interest as was done in this case by the mortgage to secure
Ridley. Petitioner seems to draw a distinction between the
surplus remaining after the satisfaction of the creditors and
the right of sale or conveyance by the grantor of a part of
the specific property assigned to the trustee. The naked legal
title to the property is certainly in the trustee, but the grantor
has an equitable interest in it all, and if he chooses to direct
the trustee to sell one kind of property to pay the debts, and
the creditors are not prejudiced by it, a Court of equity would
certainly compel him to do so, in order to protect the grantor,
so 1 don't see any distinction here between the equity of re
demption, or what remained after the creditors are all paid,
and the right of the grantor to sell off specific property con-
v-eyed in the deed, when he leaves enough to. pay the creditors.
In the case of Hale vs. Horn, 21 Va., page 112, this very
question comes up, and is expressly decided in accordance
with the views of this Court in relation thereto. Here the
grantor sold a part of the land embraced in a deed of trust
and conveyed it, and the debts were paid without this land,
and the Court said he had a right to do so. Here is what the^
Court says now. ''What interest did Willie Mitchell have in
the land after he gave a deed of trust? Whatever interest he
had was liable for his other debts. The whole of a man's pro
perty IS liable for his debts. A mortgage in equity is record
ed as a mere security for the debt, and only a chattel interest,
and until a foreclosure the mortgagor continues the real own
er of the fee, and may lease, sell and in every respect deal
with the mortgaged premises as owner. The equity of re
demption is descendable by inheritance, devisable by will and
alienable by deed, precisely as if it were an absolute es-.
[85] tate of inheritance at law. It was entirely competent
for Mitchell after the conveyance of his land in trust
for the payment of his debts to make an absolute conveyance
of them to Nuckols and Gregory, and his deed was good to
pass title to them, subject however, to the encumbrances of
the deed of trust, and after the payment of the whole of the
debts secured by the deed of trust, the grantor and the vendee
are entitled to hold the land at law, or in equity, notwithstand
ing the conveyance has not been made by the trustee."
Again, in the samecase of Hale vs. Horn on page 123, this
language is used: "I cannot think it was the intention of the
Legislature to require, or even authorize the trustee to pay
the surplus furds in his hands to an insolvent grantor, when
other creditors are entitled to it, of which the trustee has
notice." The terms of this deed are that the said trustee
shall pay the debts first, and pay the remainder to Arrington,
the executor or ass'gn, and the Court said a little further
down on page 124 "There might be a party claiming the fund
(as there is in this case) under ah assignment from the gran
tor (here in this case it is claimed by a sale froin the grantor
by theseplaintiffs) and adversely to him, of which the truste'^
had notice (here this claim is adverse to Arrington and he
is fighting it, and the trustee had notice of it). Will it be
contended, says the Court, that the trustee would be justified
in ignoringthe assignee and paying the fund over to the gran
tor." *'Does the assignee of the property occupy any higher
ground than the judgment creditor, who is entitled to it by
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operation of law?" .
I think this case is entirely in point, and shows that a
sale of the. property embraced in the deed of trust by the
grantor may be made without the concurrence of thie trustee,
'and the trustee is bound to recognize the rights of the pur
chaser, unless his so doing conflicts with the interest of the
creditors. This is nothing more than justice, if it is not law.
He can't sell the property if he has notice of the sale by the
grantor, and a court of equity will prevent him from so doing,
this case holds. It is claimed that the grantor had di-
[86] vested himself of all' title to the property described
in the deed of trust, and could make no valid sale of
any part thereof. Nobody has contended in this'case that the
grantor can so interfere with the property in such a way as
to damage the creditors, but only in such a way as does not
damage the creditors, which he plainly has a right to do under
the authorities referred to. Suppose, for instance, as I under
stand in the case here, the debts have been all paid off, and
this property remains unsold by the trustee, what would he
do with it I. Would he, in the face of the case of Hale vs. Horn
turn it over to Arrington and make these plaintiffs bring a
suit at law for damages, or would he turn it over to them?
Certainly the Court would require that the property be turned
over,, because it was Arrington's con<^ract, and one which he
made advisedly, with the advice of able counsel, and conscien
tious man, who d d nothing except what Arrington asked him
to do. The tomatoes were put upon the market by Arring
ton time and again, and tried to sell them, and they were sold
to the plaintiffs, becausp they were thought to be offering the
best and most advantageous bid for them. There is no undue
influence shown whatever. Mr. Arrington alleges it, and the
trustees say so, but when you read the testimony of John Ab
bot, everything they say is refuted, and knowing him as I do,
I have no doubt of what he says. The trustees in this ciase
are not agents of both parties here. They have taken the cud
gel of Arrington, and are trying to assist him as attorneys to
defeat the plaintiffs in the enforcement of their contract.
There is no doubt about this proposition, and I don't suppose
the gentlemen will deny it. This is not said in a spirit of criti
cism, but as a reason why these people are entitled: to the pro
tection of a Court of equity in the administration of these
tomatoes.
8J •
And now on this day to-wit:
At Bedford Circuit Court, January 29th, 1924.
This day this cause came on,to be again heard on the
papers formerly read, and the petition of S. S. Lam-
[871 beth, Jr., trustee, herein filed by leave of Court, and
was argued by counsel, and the parties hereto by their
respective attorneys have appeared in Court and admitted
that all the allegations of fact contained in the petition of the
said :S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee,are true, except the allega
tion as to the contractural capacity of J. Howard Arrington
at the time of the signing of the contract with C. W. Grills for
the sale of the tomatoes, as in the bill of complaint set forth,
"which last mentioned allegation is not admitted, and the Court
being of the opinion that the petition of S. S. Lambeth,
trustee, for a bJl of review in this cause, states no ground to
justify a bill of review, either upon the law or upon after dis
covered evidence, doth dismiss said bill of review, except so
far as same* asks that said Lambeth be treated still as trustee
under said deed of trust, and said Lambeth, trustee, is con
sequently hereby made a party to this suit and allowed to
make such defense as to h m may seem best.
And it being further admitted by the parties to this suit
by their counsel that in pursuance of an agreement made be
tween the parties to this suit since the institution thereof,
that the tomatoes described in the contract of sale aforesaid
have been sold, that the total value realized from the sale of
said tomatoes was $14,033.12, of which sum $9,970.02 was paid
to Landon Lowrj^ trustee for J. H. Arrington, that being the
amount due for said tomatoes according to the terms of the
said contract of sale, and that the balance of the proceeds
from the sale of the said tomatoes, to-wit, the sum-of ^,062.20,
was by consent of parties, deposited in the Lynchburg Trust
and Savings Bank in Bedford, Virginia, to the credit of Hun
ter Miller and Landon Lowry, attorneys, to await the decision
of this Court in this case.
And it being further admitted by the parties to this suit
that the remainder of the property still owned by J. H. Ar
lington, and embraced in said deed of assignment to iS. S.
Lambeth, Jr., trustee, is more than enough to pay off
[®8] all of the debt® secured thereby, and the Court being
of the opinion tiiat the contract aforesaid between J. H.
Arrington, John L. Abbots attorney for S. S. Lambeth, Jr.,
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trustee, and C. W. Gills, whereby the said tomatoes were sold
to the said C. W. Gills, was a valid contract, and it now being
admitted that the said J. H. Atrington was solvent at the
time of the execution of the said contract, the court deems it
unnecessary to require the account heretofore ordered to be
taken in this cause, but being of the opinion that C. W. Gills,
G. M. Arrington, George W. Johnson and J. T. Davidson, for
whom C. W. Gills purchased the said tomatoes, are entitled to
the proceeds frcm the sale of same, after the payment to the
said J. H, Arrington or his trustee, the amount due him under
the said contract, doth adjudge, order and decree, that the
said money amounting to $4,062 20, with the accumulated bank
interest thereon, which is now deposited in the Lynchburg
Trust and Savings Bank in Bedford, Virgmia, as aforesaid,
be turned over to the said C. W. Gills, G. M. "Wigington,
George W. Johnson and J. T. Davidson, instead of to the said
J. Howard Arrington, from whom they purchased the said
tomatoes.
The written opinion of the Court in relation to the deter
mination of th's cause is herewith filed and made a part of
the record in this suit.
And the Court doth further adjudge, order and decree
that the plaintiffs in the original cause do recover against
the said J. Howard Arrington and Landon Lowry, his trustee,
out of any funds in his hands as such trustee, the costs sn this
suit, and the said J. Howard Arrington and -Landon Lowrj^
trustee, and S. S. Lambeth, Jr., trustee, having indicated an
intention to take an appeal from this decision, the court doth
suspend the execution of this decree for a period of ninety
days, provided the said defendants or some one of them, shall
enter into a bond before the Clerk of this Court in the penalty
of $250.00, with security to be approved by said Clerk.
Clerk's Certificate
Virginia:
In Bedford Circuit Court Clerk's Office.
^ I, V. W. Nichols, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Bedford
County, Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a
true transcript of the record in the cause in chancery late
pending in the said Court under the style of C. "W. GiUs and
others against Landon Lowry, trustee &c., and I further cer-
9.1
tify that the provisions of Section 6339 have |been complied
with by the appellants.
Given under my hand this 22nd day of July 1924.
V. W. NICHOLS,
Clerk of the Circuit Court
of Bedford County, Virginia.
A Copy.
Teste :
J. M. KELLY,
Clerk.
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